Press - Male (00:00):
We already talked about it, we can't.
Press - Female (00:01):
Why not?
Press - Male (00:02):
Because he's using a laser pointer. He can't shoot a laser pointer across the Secretary. So he's just going to turn and come here. You guys are just going to have to shut down, it's no big deal.
Press - Female (00:07):
I know, but we can't get the shot of it too though from over here.
Press - Male (00:14):
Cuts never gets the ground. We have time. We can make this work.
Press - Female (00:18):
Dave, the chairman will…
Press - Male (03:20):
Hey, do me a favor, don't take any pictures of it until… No photos, no pictures…
(03:20)
I think that's fine.
(03:20)
Ho you looking for that? You can hit that? I know you got some heads in this… We could go one step higher if you want to. That would, they might still be heads, it better.
Press - Female (03:23):
Hi.
(03:23)
How are you?
Press - Male (03:23):
How's that?
(03:23)
Much better.
(03:23)
Better?
(03:23)
So the lights…
Press - Female (03:23):
Is everybody okay?
(03:23)
I know.
(03:23)
I've been using my fans so much. Game changing in the scene.
Press - Male (07:47):
Stand by. Everyone take off their badges. If you're wearing a badge, please tuck it into your coat. We'll take it off.
(07:51)
Two minutes everybody.
Hegseth (10:50):
Well, good morning everybody. Just arrived last night back from NATO. Two days apart from my battle buddy. So it's good to see him this morning. Good to see you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chariman (11:00):
You too, sir.
Hegseth (11:02):
Where there was a historic outcome. I want to start with that real quick. I think there's so much news, so many things happening that oftentimes big momentous moments get missed. What President Trump accomplished in NATO yesterday was game-changing and historic. A shift in burden-sharing to the European responsibility in NATO that most would've said was impossible at the beginning of his term, but he said, NATO needs to pay up. They started in the first term and here in his second term, we've accelerated that. 32 NATO countries committed to spending 5% of their GDP on defense, on actually investing in the NATO alliance. So I hope with all the ink spilled, all of your outlets find the time to properly recognize this historic change in continental security that other presidents tried to do, other presidents talked about. President Trump accomplished it. It's a huge deal. You see, we're here this morning because in hunting for scandals all the time in trying to find wedges and spin stories, this Press Corps and the Press Corps miss historic moments.
(12:19)
You miss historic moments like 5% at NATO, which when you hear I was in the closed-door briefing, I wish there could have been cameras in there. When you heard the prime ministers and presidents of other countries to a man and to a woman looking at President Trump and saying, "This never could have happened, never would've happened. Seemed impossible five years ago, two years ago, eight years ago. But here we are because of your leadership." If you ask them the question, I bet they'd say the same thing. But searching for scandals, you miss historic moments like recruiting at the Pentagon. Historic levels in the army, the Air Force, in the Navy.
(12:54)
Yeah, maybe there'll be a little mention here or there, but because it was under President Trump's leadership, because Americans are responding to him as commander-in-chief, the Press Corps doesn't want to write about him or bring us to the topic of the moment, the highly successful strikes in Iran. Let me read the bottom line here. President Trump directed the most complex and secretive military operation in history, and it was a resounding success resulting in a ceasefire agreement and the end of the 12-Day war. There's been a lot of discussion about what happened and what didn't happen. Step back for a second. Because of decisive military action, president Trump created the conditions to end the war decimating, choose your word, obliterating, destroying Iran's nuclear capabilities. I want to read some of the assessments that have been provided because whether it's fake news, CNN, MSNBC, or the New York Times, there's been fawning
Hegseth (14:00):
… coverage of a preliminary assessment. I've had a chance to read it. Every outlet has breathlessly reported on a preliminary assessment from DIA. I'm looking at it right now. Again, it was preliminary, a day and a half after the actual strike when it admits itself in writing that it requires weeks to accumulate the necessary data to make such an assessment, it's preliminary. It points out that it's not been coordinated with the intelligence community at all. There's low confidence in this particular report. It says in the report there are gaps in the information. It says in the report, multiple linchpin assumptions are what this assessment… A linchpin assumption. You know what that is? That means your entire premise is predicated on a linchpin. If you're wrong, everything else is wrong. And yet, still this report acknowledges it's likely severe damage. Again, this is preliminary. But leaked because someone had an agenda to try to muddy the waters and make it look like this historic strike wasn't successful.
(15:00)
I'm going to get to the chairman in a moment, because he's going to lay out the particulars for you based on his professional military experience. But here's what other folks are saying. The DIA that put that report out says that this is a preliminary low confidence report and will continue to be refined as additional intelligence becomes available. How about the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission? The devastating US strikes on Fordow destroyed the site's critical infrastructure and rendered the enrichment facility inoperable. Have any of these quotes made their way into the New York Times or the Washington Post? MSNBC? CNN? Any of these quotes?
(15:39)
How about this one? This is a new one from the UN, the United Nations. No friend of the United States or certainly Israel often. Here's the head of the UN Atomic Energy Agency this morning. Rafael Grossi, "US and Israeli strikes caused enormous damage to Iran's nuclear sites." Don't take my word for it. How about the IDF's chief of staff? "I can say here that the assessment is that we significantly damaged the nuclear program, setting it back by years." I repeat years. The Iranian foreign minister, the spokesman, "Our nuclear installations have been badly damaged, that's for sure." I'm sure that's an understatement.
(16:20)
John Radcliffe, the director of the CIA, putting out a statement just last night. "CIA can confirm that a body of credible intelligence indicates Iran's nuclear program has been severely damaged by recent targeted strikes. This includes new intelligence from a historically reliable," very different than preliminary assessment with low confidence. He's saying, "historically reliable and accurate source of method that several key Iranian nuclear facilities were destroyed and would have to be rebuilt over the course of years. CIA continues to collect additional reliably sourced information to keep appropriate decision-makers fully informed."
(17:04)
How about DNI, Tulsi Gabbard? Yesterday, she writes, and I quote, "New intelligence confirms what POTUS has stated numerous times. Iran's nuclear facilities have been destroyed." Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright, "Overall Israel and US attacks have effectively destroyed Iran's centrifuge enrichment program."
(17:31)
Time and time again, I can go down the list, those that understand, those that see, those that do proper assessments recognize that what the United States military did was historic. And again, before I pass it to the chairman, because you, and I mean specifically you, the press, specifically you, the press corps, because you cheer against Trump so hard, it's like in your DNA and in your blood to cheer against Trump because you want him not to be successful so bad. You have to cheer against the efficacy of these strikes. You have to hope maybe they weren't effective. Maybe the way the Trump Administration has represented them isn't true. So let's take half-truths, spun information, leaked information, and then spin it. Spin it in every way we can to try to cause doubt and manipulate the public mind over whether or not our brave pilots were successful.
(18:35)
How many stories have been written about how hard it is to, I don't know, fly a plane for 36 hours? Has MSNBC done that story? Has Fox? Have we done the story how hard that is? Have we done it two or three times so that American people understand how about how difficult it is to shoot a drone from an F-15 or 16 or F-22 or F-35, or what it's like to man a Patriot battery or how hard it is to refuel midair? Giving the American people an understanding of how complex and sophisticated this mission really was.
(19:05)
There are so many aspects of what our brave men and women did that, because of the hatred of this press corps, are undermined because people are trying to leak and spin that it wasn't successful. It's irresponsible. And folks in this room are privy to that information because of the proximity here in the Pentagon. It's an important responsibility. And time to time again, classified information is leaked or peddled for political purposes to try to make the president look bad. And what's really happening is you're undermining the success of incredible B-2 pilots and incredible F-35 pilots and incredible refuelers and incredible air defenders who accomplished their mission, set back a nuclear program in ways that other Presidents would've dreamed.
(19:52)
How about we celebrate that? How about we talk about how Special America is that only we have these capabilities? I think it's too much to ask, unfortunately, for the fake news. So we're used to that. But we also have an opportunity to stand at the podium and read the truth of what's really happening. And the reality is you want to call it destroyed, you want to call it defeated, you want to call it obliterated. Choose your word. This was an historically successful attack, and we should celebrate it as Americans. And it gives us a chance to have peace, chance to have a deal, and an opportunity to prevent a nuclear Iran, which is something President Trump talked about for 20 years and no other presidents had the courage to actually do. So with that, I want to hand it over to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. They've done technical analysis on this, not just on the strike, but also on our Patriot Defenders on Al Udeid. And Mr. Chairman, I'll hand it over to you.
Lt. Gen. Dan Caine (20:45):
Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and good morning. All of you, thank you. Thank you for being here. As a follow-up to my comments on Sunday's press conference, I wanted to give you a few updates this morning on something I'm honored to do as a chairman and that's a chance to get to talk about some of our service members and the incredible things that they do on behalf of our nation. And I apologize ahead of time for the length and the detail.
(21:10)
Today, I'm going to brief you on a couple things. First, I'm going to talk about our air defenders at Al Udeid in Qatar and their actions on Monday. Then I'm going to walk you through a little bit about the academics that went into the attack against Fordow, the massive ordnance penetrator weapon, and we're going to show a video that highlights the effects that that weapon has. Of course, nobody was down inside the target, so we don't have video from the target.
(21:37)
First on Monday. As the president has stated, on Monday morning, we began to receive indications and warnings that Iran intended to attack US bases in the region. That morning, building on the work that CENTCOM Commander Eric Carrillo had done, and on the orders of the president at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and around the region, we assumed a minimum force posture. Most folks had moved off the base to extend the security perimeter out away from what we assessed might be a target zone, except for a very few Army soldiers at Al Udeid.
(22:17)
At that point, only two Patriot batteries remained on base. Roughly 44 American soldiers responsible for defending the entire base, to include CENTCOM's forward headquarters in the Middle East, an entire air base and all the US forces there. The oldest soldier was a 28-year-old captain. The youngest was a 21-year-old private who'd been in the military for less than two years.
(22:48)
So let's put ourselves out there for a second. Imagine you're that young first lieutenant, you're 25 or 26 years old, and you've been assigned as the tactical director inside the command and control element. You, at that age, are the sole person responsible to defend this base. Listening next to you is your early warning operator whose job is to notify you of imminent attack. There's five people inside a vehicle, and five people outside of a vehicle around these. A total of, as I said, 44. By the way, you've sat in the Middle East for years, deployed over and over again, extended multiple times, always being prepared, but unsure of when that particular day will come, that you must execute your mission and not fail at doing it.
(23:44)
In this case, these Patriot crews were deployed from Korea and Japan as part of our US forces there to ensure that we had the most capable missiles in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. As the day continues, you start to hear more and more chatter in the information space about a pending attack. And as the sun starts to set in the west, you get orders from your higher headquarters to make sure that your missile batteries are pointed to the north. There are just a few other teammates. It's hot, you're getting nervous, and you expect an attack.
(24:23)
Outside of those Patriot vehicles, your hot crew, which is one NCO and four additional soldiers, turns a key and relinquishes control of those missiles to that young lieutenant inside the vehicle. And you wait. You know that you're going to have approximately two minutes, 120 seconds, to either succeed or fail. And then at approximately 12:30 P.M. on Monday, that's 7:30 P.M. in Qatar, as the sun sets in the West, Iran attacks. As the targets were detected, round after round of Patriot missiles are ejected from their canisters by an initial launch charge. Then the main solid rocket motor ignites. You can feel this in your body if you've ever been around a Patriot taking a shot. And round after round goes out and guides against those missiles coming inbound.
(25:22)
We believe that this is the largest single Patriot engagement in US military history, and we were joined in this engagement by the Qatari Patriot crews. I'm not going to tell you how many rounds were shot, but it was a bunch, because of classified purposes. And we're aware that there's reports of something getting through. What we do know is there was a lot of metal flying around. Between attacking missiles being hit by Patriots, boosters from attacking missiles being hit by Patriots, the Patriots themselves flying around, and the debris from those Patriots hitting the ground, there was a lot of metal flying around. And yet, our US air defenders had only seconds to make complex decisions with strategic impact.
(26:12)
These awesome humans, along with their Qatari brothers and sisters-in-arms, stood between a salvo of Iranian missiles and the safety of Al Udeid. They are the unsung heroes of the 21st century United States Army. And I know a lot of you have seen the videos online and the excitement as those Patriots departed their launchers and went up and guided. This really demonstrates the combat capability and capacity of our Army air defenders. Simply stated, they absolutely crushed it.
(26:48)
If you'd flip this over. Thanks. Let me next move to a walkthrough of the GBU-57, a Massive Ordnance Penetrator weapon, and share a little bit about the planners who did this and their work on the weapon. First, let me set the stage for you. There's an organization in the US called the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DTRA. DTRA does a lot of things for our nation, but DTRA is the world's leading expert on deeply buried underground targets. In 2009, a Defense Threat Reduction Agency officer was brought into a vault at an undisclosed location and briefed on something going on in Iran. For security purposes, I'm not going to share his name. He was shown some photos and some highly classified intelligence of what looked like a major construction project in the mountains of Iran. He was tasked to study this facility, work with the intelligence community to understand it, and he was soon joined by an additional teammate. For more than 15 years,
Lt. Gen. Dan Caine (28:00):
This officer and his teammate lived and breathed this single target, Fordow, a critical element of Iran's covert nuclear weapons program. He studied the geology. He watched the Iranians dig it out. He watched the construction, the weather, the discard material, the geology, the construction materials, where the materials came from. He looked at the vent shaft, the exhaust shaft, the electrical systems, the environmental control systems, every nook, every crater, every piece of equipment going in and every piece of equipment going out. They literally dreamed about this target at night when they slept. They thought about it driving back and forth to work, and they knew from the very first days what this was for. You do not build a multi-layered underground bunker complex with centrifuges and other equipment in a mountain for any peaceful purpose.
(28:58)
They weren't able to discuss this with their family, their wives, their kids, their friends, but they just kept grinding it out and along the way they realized we did not have a weapon that could adequately strike and kill this target. So they began a journey to work with industry and other tacticians to develop the GBU-57. They tested it over and over again, tried different options, tried more After that, they accomplished hundreds of test shots and dropped many full-scale weapons against extremely realistic targets for a single purpose, kill this target at the time and place of our nation's choosing.
(29:43)
And then on a day in June of 2025, more than 15 years after they started their life's work, the phone rang and the President of the United States ordered the B-2 force that you've supported to go strike and kill this target. Yesterday I had the incredible honor and privilege of spending time with these two Defense Threat Reduction Agency officers who've given so much. One of them said, quote, I can't even get my head around this. My heart is so filled with the pride of being a part of this team. I am so honored to be a part of this. To you both, thank you and thank you to your families.
(30:24)
Operation Midnight Hammer was the culmination of this 15 years of incredible work, the air crews, the tanker crews, the weapons crews that built the weapons, the load crews that loaded it. Before I run through this video today, I want to talk a little bit about weaponeering and what goes into an attack. Weaponeering is the science of evaluating a target. I mentioned all of those factors before that these two DTRA officers had thought about. Ultimately, weaponeering is determining the right weapon and fuse combination to achieve the desired effects and maximum destruction against a target. In the case of Fordow, the DTRA team understood with a high degree of confidence the elements of the target required to kill its functions. And the weapons were designed, planned, and delivered to ensure that they achieved the effects in the mission space.
(31:20)
By the way, in the beginning of its development, we had so many PhDs working on the MOP program doing modeling and simulation that we were quietly and in a secret way, the biggest users of super computer hours within the United States of America. So let me talk about the graphic a little bit and the GBU-57, which all of you I know know is a 30,000 pound weapon dropped only by the B-2. It's comprised of steel, explosive and a fuse. Programmed bespokely each weapon to achieve a particular effect inside the target. Each weapon had a unique desired impact angle, arrival, final heading, and a fuse setting. The fuse is effectively what tells the bomb when to function. A longer delay in a fuse, the deeper the weapon will penetrate and drive into the target.
(32:26)
So on Fordow, in June of 2008 you can see these three holes. Depicted here is the main exhaust shaft with two additional ventilation shafts on either side. The United States decided to strike these two ventilation shafts seen here on the main graphic as the primary point of entry into the mission space. In the days preceding the attack against Fordow the Iranians attempted to cover the shafts with concrete to try to prevent an attack. I won't share the specific dimensions of the concrete cap, but you should know that we know what the dimensions of those concrete caps were. The planners had to account for this, they accounted for everything.
(33:15)
The cap was forcibly removed by the first weapon and the main shaft was uncovered. Weapons two, three, four, five were tasked to enter the main shaft, move down into the complex at greater than 1,000 feet per second and explode in the mission space. Weapon number six was designed on each side, so there were six on each side, weapons number six was designed as a flex weapon to allow us to cover if one of the preceding jets or one of the preceding weapons did not work. The video I'm about to show you is a culmination of over 15 years of development and testing. As I said, hundreds of test shots on various models. This is one weapon. So if you take a view of this five additionals, you'll get a sense of what this looks like. Hopefully you can see it and there's not too much reflection.
(34:21)
Tom runs our videos out there. We'll run it at full speed so you can see it and then go back through it. Go ahead Tom. Keep it going for a minute, you'll see inside the mission space.
(35:12)
Unlike a normal surface bomb, you won't see an impact crater because they're designed to deeply bury and then function. I know there's been a lot of questions about that. All six weapons at each vent at Fordow went exactly where they were intended to go. A bomb has three effects that causes damage, blast, fragmentation, and overpressure. In this case, the primary kill mechanism in the mission space was a mix of overpressure and blast ripping through the open tunnels and destroying critical hardware. The majority of the damage we assessed based on our extensive modeling was a blast layer combined with the impulse extending from the shock. Imagine what this looks like six times over.
(36:02)
A point that I want to make here. The Joint Force does not do BDA, by design we don't grade our own homework, the intelligence community does, but here's what we know following the attacks and the strikes on Fordow. First that the weapons were built, tested and loaded properly. Two, the weapons were released on speed and on parameters. Three, the weapons all guided to their intended targets and to their intended aim Points. Four, the weapons functioned as designed, meaning they exploded. We know this through other means, intelligence means that we have that we were visibly able to see them. And we know that the trailing jets saw the first weapons function and the pilots stated, quote, this was the brightest explosion that I've ever seen. It literally looked like daylight. Let me now turn to the bomber crews themselves, give you a few details about them. The crews that attacked Fordow were from the active duty Air Force and the Missouri Air National Guard. The crews ranked from captain to colonel and most were graduates of the Air Force Weapons School headquartered at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. I will state for the record that there is no beach volleyball or football at the Air Force Weapons School. They were male and female aviators on this mission. And a crew member told me when I talked to them on video the other day that this felt like the Super Bowl, the thousands of scientists, airmen, and maintainers all coming together.
(37:44)
One last story about people. When the crews went to work on Friday, they kissed their loved ones goodbye not knowing when or if they'd be home late on Saturday night, their families became aware of what was happening. And on Sunday when those jets returned from Whiteman, their families were there, flags flying and tears flowing. I have chills literally talking about this. The jets rejoined into a formation of four airplanes, followed by a formation of three and came up overhead, Whiteman proudly in the traffic pattern, pitching out to land right over the base and landing to the incredible cheers of their families who sacrifice and serve right alongside their family members.
(38:33)
Like I said, there were a lot of flags and a lot of tears. One commander told me this is a moment in the lives of our families that they will never forget. That, my friends, is what America's Joint Force does. We think we develop, we train, we rehearse, we test, we evaluate every single day and when the call comes to deliver, we do so. I could not be more proud standing up here today of our Joint Force. I'm filled with gratitude that I get to tell their story. And as we stand here right now, our forces remain on a high state of readiness in the region, prepared to defend themselves.
(39:13)
And one last thing, our adversaries around the world should know that there are other DTRA team members out there studying targets for the same amount of time and we'll continue to do so. Thank you very much. I apologize for the length. I look forward to your questions.
Hegseth (39:32):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you by the way, for that extensive work, the lay down. Do you have that laser pointer?
Lt. Gen. Dan Caine (39:40):
Yes, sir.
Hegseth (39:42):
Thank you. Squaring me away, as always.
(39:44)
I mean, even… If you see the post-strike shaft of the three holes, and fairly so, the vast majority speculation has been, those are the three strike points. When in actuality what you realize is these are the vents, these are the caps, the first munition took the cap off and the other five went down the center hole. Which if you're planning the target, you would want it to be the direct you going to the bottom. These are the types of things that go into the planning for a strike that the Pentagon would not expect the press corps or the American people to initially understand.
(40:20)
So laying this information out is helpful. But it's also why we ask for a beat, for a moment, for a day or two, the opportunity to tell that story because as the Chairman said, these men and women that did this mission, they just want to do their job. They're not expecting their story to be told. They're not expecting the glory. They are grateful for the flags and the hugs of family. That's why they do the job. But they also know they were a part of something historic. We know how historic it was. The Chairman does. I know, our staffs know. And so that's why we are… And the President of the United States knows, and that's why it's almost personal when we see the way in which leaks are used to try to disparage the outcome or muddy the waters about the impact of what happened without being responsible with information and allowing the professionals to assess and provide that information just like the Chairman did.
(41:16)
So thank you Mr. Chairman, for that information.
Lt. Gen. Dan Caine (41:18):
Sure.
Hegseth (41:19):
And we welcome a few additional questions. Yes, sir.
Speaker 1 (41:22):
General, on Sunday you said final battle damage take some time. And you also said, I think BDA is still pending. And it would be way too early for me to comment on what may or may not still be there at the nuclear facility. That was just over three days ago. So what has changed? Would you use the term obliterated as well?
Lt. Gen. Dan Caine (41:44):
Sir, like I said, we don't do BDA. I'll refer that to the intelligence community. And-
Speaker 1 (41:49):
You're talking with them. I mean, what changed in the past three days and make you so-
Lt. Gen. Dan Caine (41:53):
Sir, I think…
Hegseth (41:54):
I mean, explained what changed. There was a great deal of irresponsible
Hegseth (42:00):
… responsible reporting based on leaks, preliminary information in low-confidence. Again, when someone leaks something, they do it with an agenda. And when you leak a portion of an intelligence assessment, but just a little portion, just the little portion that makes it seem like maybe the strike wasn't effective, then you start a news cycle. Whether it's the Washington Post or Fox News or CNN or MSNBC, you start a news cycle that starts to call into question the efficacy. No, that's why.
(42:28)
So you bring the Chairman here who's not involved in politics. He doesn't do politics. That's my lane to understand and translate and talk about those types of things. So I can use the word obliterated, he could use defeat, destroyed, assess, all of those things. But ultimately we're here to clarify what these weapons are capable of which anyone with two eyes and a brain can recognize that kind of firepower with that specificity at that location and others is going to have a devastating effect.
(42:55)
So we all recognize there will be days and weeks ahead. That's why yesterday I said, if you want to know what's going on Fordow, you better go there and get a big shovel because no one's under there right now. No one's under there able to assess. And everyone's using reflections of what they see. And that's why the Israelis, the Iranians, the IAEA, the UN to a man and to a woman who recognize the capability of this weapon system are acknowledging how destructive it's been. So that's what's changed.
Speaker 2 (43:20):
[inaudible 00:43:20] so confident just three or four days later.
Hegseth (43:23):
See, this is a point. This is how difficult it is to actually manage. You just watched a video of what this weapon is capable of. That's where we find our confidence is in the skilled men and women and the capability of the systems they employed and the recognition so far and the reflections that it was a highly successful mission.
Lt. Gen. Dan Caine (43:41):
Sure. I think you could, I'd say go out. The IC should be able to help you answer that question. They look at a variety. As the Secretary has alluded to, we look at a variety of things. I don't do that. They do all different sources of intel, which I'd refer you to them to get clarity on the end stage.
Hegseth (44:01):
So again, I go back to the IC, whether it's Director Radcliffe or DNI Gabbard. I read the statements at the beginning. They're the ones aggregating the intelligence and they're saying nuclear facilities were destroyed and would have to be rebuilt over a number of years. Facilities were destroyed.
(44:17)
What do we got? Right here.
Speaker 3 (44:18):
Sir, you cited a body of credible intelligence to suggest that the damage at Fordow and other places. What is that referring to and when could we see it?
Hegseth (44:28):
I was reading from CIA Director statement, which came out last night. CIA again, they do the BDA, they do the assessment. CIA can confirm that a body of credible intelligence indicates, it also goes on to say new intelligence from historically reliable and accurate sources and methods. Now you can imagine, you can imagine the CIA Director is going to be very careful about how he articulates things of that sensitivity. Classified, secret, top secret, compartmentalized. He's going to know things that you're not going to know, that the press isn't going to know. And he's reflecting that the sources he's seeing are highly credible. They've given credible intelligence. They are those processes of giving credible intelligence in the past, and that's what he's basing it on.
Speaker 3 (45:12):
So do you think we need to see that?
Hegseth (45:14):
Do you have a top secret clearance, sir?
Speaker 3 (45:16):
Eventually the American public want to see it.
Hegseth (45:21):
Okay, yes sir. Yes. Yeah, you.
Speaker 4 (45:22):
I wanted to ask briefly just-
Hegseth (45:24):
No, no. Not you. Checkered shirt.
Speaker 5 (45:25):
Oh. So Mike Glenn with the Washington Times.
Hegseth (45:27):
Yes, sir.
Speaker 5 (45:28):
Thanks sir. Anybody who's ever read a battalion S2 report after a fight knows that it's usually the initial report is usually wrong, sometimes grossly so. Has what happened in this incident caused y'all to sort of rethink the intelligence process or the dissemination, or do you think it's just a matter, I mean, if the process itself doesn't require any more adjustment?
Hegseth (45:54):
Well, I can tell you what the chairman told me in the Situation Room and reminded us all, which is alongside what you just said, sir, is that the first reports are almost always wrong. They're almost always incomplete, right? Anything, whether it's a squad level operation or a strategic level operation, the initial reflections you get are coming at you at a high rate of speed from a lot of different sources. So your job is to step back and assess them.
(46:18)
And that's why we're urging caution about putting it, premising entire stories on biased leaks to biased publications trying to make something look bad. How about we take a beat, recognize first the success of our warriors, hold them up, tell their stories, celebrate that, wave an American flag, be proud of what we accomplished. And in the meantime, I can assure you, the chairman and his staff, the intelligence community, our staff and others are doing all the assessments necessary to make sure that mission was indeed successful.
(46:49)
Yes, right there.
Speaker 6 (46:51):
Sir. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, Iran has recognized that their nuclear program was indeed severely damaged, but they also said that the US strikes only strengthened their ability and their determination to complete their nuclear program. How do you respond to that, sir? Is that a provocation from Iran?
Hegseth (47:09):
Well, I would say Iran's going to have to say a lot of things right now in order to bolster their image, especially internally. In the media, there's a lot of things they'll say for domestic consumption.
(47:23)
But we're watching very closely what they do. Again, that's the intel community. Our job as the Chairman, I mean, the Chairman laid it up so beautifully. Our job is to be prepared. And how proud are you? How proud am I? I didn't know the full story of those men and women 15 years ago who've been pointing at that target. That makes me proud to be an American. That's an awesome story. I hope we can tell more aspects of that in an unclassified way in the future. That's a great thing to know.
(47:47)
Our job is to be prepared when the Commander-in-Chief calls based on those assessments. So of course our IC, the intelligence committee will keep watching what Iran does and pay attention to that. But the President has created the contours, the opportunity for a deal, for peace, in something that the world said was intractable, that wasn't possible. And we got that peace, that ceasefire, that option because of strength, because of his willingness to use American military might that no one else on the planet can do with the kind of planners and operators that the chairman just laid out.
(48:20)
Yes, sir. Right there. Yep.
Speaker 7 (48:22):
Me sir? Just a quick question. There's public imagery available saying that highly enriched uranium was moved out of Fordow before the strikes. Is that accurate? Have you seen that?
(48:33)
And Mr. Chairman, a question for you. Have you been pressured to change your assessment or give a more rosy intelligence assessment to us by any political factors, whether it's the President or the Secretary? And if you were, would you do that?
Lt. Gen. Dan Caine (48:48):
Yeah. Well, that one's easy. No. No, I have not. And no, I would not. My job as the Chairman is to offer a range of options to the President and the National Command Authority to deliver the risks associated with each of those and then take the orders of the National Command Authority and go execute them. I've never been pressured by the President or the Secretary to do anything other than tell him exactly what I'm thinking. And that's exactly what I've done.
Speaker 7 (49:19):
And the highly enriched uranium?
Hegseth (49:21):
There's nothing that I've seen that suggests that we didn't hit exactly what we wanted to hit in those locations.
Speaker 8 (49:27):
That's not the question though. It's about highly enriched uranium. Do you have certainty that all the highly enriched uranium was inside the Fordow Mountain or some of it because there were satellite photos that showed more than a dozen trucks there two days in advance. Are you certain none of that highly enriched uranium was moved?
Hegseth (49:46):
Of course, we're watching every single aspect. But Jennifer, you've been about the worst, the one who misrepresents the most intentionally.
Speaker 8 (49:54):
I don't-
Hegseth (49:55):
What the President says. I'm familiar.
Speaker 8 (49:58):
I was the first to report about the ventilation shafts on Saturday night, and in fact, I was the first to describe the B2 bombers, the refueling, the entire mission with great accuracy. So I take issue with that.
Hegseth (50:11):
I appreciate you acknowledging-
Speaker 8 (50:12):
You have issues-
Hegseth (50:12):
… this was the first … the most successful-
Speaker 8 (50:15):
I did-
Hegseth (50:16):
… mission based on operational security that this department has done since you've been here.
Speaker 8 (50:20):
I absolutely did.
Hegseth (50:20):
And I appreciate that.
Speaker 8 (50:22):
I absolutely did.
Hegseth (50:22):
We're looking at all aspects of intelligence and making sure we have a sense of what was where.
Speaker 9 (50:28):
Excuse me. So why not acknowledge the female pilots that also participated in this mission? The early messages that you sent out only congratulated the boys.
Hegseth (50:35):
So when I say something like our boys and bombers … See, this is the kind of thing the press does, right? Of course, the Chairman mentioned a female bomber pilot. That's fantastic. She's fantastic. She's a hero. I want more female bomber pilots. I hope the men and women of our country sign-up to do such brave and audacious things. But when you spin it as, because I say our boys and bombers as a common phrase, I'll keep saying things like that, whether they're men or women. We're very proud of that female pilot. Just like I'm very proud of those male pilots. And I don't care if it's a male or a female in that cockpit and the American people don't care. But it's the obsession with race and gender. In this department that's changed priorities, we don't do that anymore. We don't play your little games.
(51:15)
Yes, right there.
Speaker 9 (51:16):
Are you for certain that the uranium was removed from the facility before the B2 struck?
Hegseth (51:19):
So I'm not aware of any intelligence that I've reviewed that says things were not where they were supposed to be, moved or otherwise.
Speaker 10 (51:26):
Mr. Secretary.
Hegseth (51:27):
Yes.
Speaker 10 (51:27):
Kellie Meyer with NewsNation and just off the top want to say we're grateful for the service of these pilots and everybody that serves. I wanted to ask you, the CIA statement said, when possible they will provide updates and information to the public for transparency, and I believe that's what we're looking for here. Do you commit to share the Defense Intelligence Agency report when it is ready so the American people can understand more about the intelligence assessment?
Hegseth (51:53):
Well, actually, the report that was discussed, this preliminary report was what's called a restrike report. So it comes to us to give us an assessment whether a target would need to be restruck, right? That's the reason why. Based on internal feedback loop that we're supposed to have access to, unfortunately someone took advantage of that. But whatever is supposed to be made public will be, but whatever has to stay sensitive can be as well.
Lt. Gen. Dan Caine (52:13):
Sir, can I jump in? One of the things that I'm trying to do through this journey that we're on together, of course transparency, but also the requirement to really protect these capabilities. I guess the time's up. So there's a balance in there. We do need to preserve options should the nation and the joint force be tasked to go do something again. So I'm confident we'll find the middle ground, but there are some things that have asked I want to not release related to-
Hegseth (52:45):
So we're going to leave it right there. I want to thank the heroism of our men and women in the military. What they accomplished is truly historic, setting back the Iranian nuclear program untold number of years. It was a devastating attack. We appreciate you covering it. Thank you very much-
Lt. Gen. Dan Caine (52:58):
Yes, sir-
Hegseth (52:59):
… Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Speaker 11 (53:24):
[inaudible 00:53:25] maybe to talk a little bit more about the [inaudible 00:53:25]
