Secretary Hegseth (00:01):
… for your boldness, for your friendship, for your leadership, and most especially for your urgency. Your urgency of the matter at hand. Which is great to see from the leader of NATO. Look forward to working very closely with him and his team.
(00:18)
And before we're talking about what we've done at the Ministerial, I want to reaffirm a few things from this podium. First, as we see it, NATO's strategic objectives are to prevent great power conflict in Europe, deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggression and defeat threats to treaty allies should deterrence fail.
(00:43)
Second, the US is committed to building a stronger, more lethal NATO. However, we must ensure that European and Canadian commitment to Article Three of this treaty is just as strong. Article Three says that allies, and I quote, "By means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." Leaders of our European allies should take primary responsibility for defense of the continent, which means security ownership by all allies, guided by a clear understanding of strategic realities. And it's an imperative given the strategic realities that we face.
(01:34)
And that begins with increasing defense spending. 2% is a start as President Trump has said, but it's not enough. Nor is 3%, nor is 4%, more like 5%. Real investment, real urgency. We can talk all we want about values. Values are important. But you can't shoot values, you can't shoot flags, and you can't shoot strong speeches. There is no replacement for hard power. As much as we may not want to like the world we live in some cases, there's nothing like hard power. It should be obvious that increasing Allied European defense spending is critical, as the President of the United States has said.
(02:30)
Also critical is expanding our defense industrial base capacity on both sides of the Atlantic. Our dollars, our euros, our pounds must become real capabilities. The US is fully committed under President Trump's leadership to pursue these objectives in the face of today's threats.
(02:54)
Yesterday, I had a chance to attend the Ukraine Defense Contact Group today participated in both the NATO Ministerial and the Ukraine Council. In both, we discussed Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. I had the chance to brief allies on President Trump's top priority: a diplomatic, peaceful end to this war as quickly as possible in a manner that creates enduring and durable peace. The American Defense Department fully supports the efforts of the Trump administration. And we look to allies to support this important work with leading on Ukraine's security assistance now through increased contributions and greater ownership of future security assistance to Ukraine. To that end, I want to thank my UK counterpart, Defense Secretary, John Healey, for hosting this Ukraine Defense Contact Group and for his leadership on support of Ukraine.
(04:00)
President Trump gave me a clear mission: achieve peace through strength, as well as put America first. Our people, our taxpayers, our borders, and our security. We are doing this by reviving the warrior ethos, rebuilding our military, and reestablishing deterrence. NATO should pursue these goals as well. NATO is a great alliance, the most successful defense alliance in history. But to endure for the future, our partners must do far more for Europe's defense. We must make NATO great again. It begins with defense spending but must also include reviving the transatlantic defense industrial base, rapidly fielding emerging technologies, prioritizing readiness and lethality, and establishing real deterrence.
(05:12)
Finally, I want to close with this. After World War Two, first General and then President Eisenhower was one of NATO's strongest supporters. He believed in a strong relationship with Europe. However, by the end of Eisenhower's presidency, even he was concerned that Europe was not shouldering enough of its own defense. Nearly making in Eisenhower's words, "A sucker out of Uncle Sam." Well, like President Eisenhower, this administration believes in alliances, deeply believes in alliances. But make no mistake, President Trump will not allow anyone to turn Uncle Sam into Uncle Sucker. Thank you. And we're glad to take some questions.
Speaker 2 (06:05):
Thanks very much. Let's start with the US traveling TV pool with Liz Ferdinand.
Liz Ferdinand (06:18):
Thank you, Secretary Hegseth. You have focused on what Ukraine is giving up. What concessions will Putin be asked to make?
Secretary Hegseth (06:27):
Well, I would start by saying the arguments that have been made that somehow coming to the table right now is making concessions to Vladimir Putin outright that we otherwise, or that the President or the United States shouldn't otherwise make. I just reject that at its face. There's a reason why negotiations are happening right now, just a few weeks after President Trump was sworn in as President of the United States. Vladimir Putin responds to strength. In 2014, he invaded Crimea not during the presidency of Donald Trump. Over four years there was no Russian aggression from 2016 to 2020.
(07:10)
In 2022, Vladimir Putin took aggression on Ukraine. Once again, not while President Trump was President of the United States. So any suggestion that President Trump is doing anything other than negotiating from a position of strength is on its face ahistorical and false. So when you look at what he may have to give or take, what's in or what's out in those negotiations, we have the perfect deal maker at the table from a position of strength to deal with both Vladimir Putin and Zelensky.
(07:45)
No one's going to get everything that they want, understanding who committed the aggression in the first place. But I challenge anyone else to think of a world leader at this moment who with credibility and strength could bring those two leaders to the table and forge a durable peace that ultimately serves the interests of Ukraine, stops the killing and the death, which President Trump has been clear he wants to do and hopefully ultimately is guaranteed by strength of Europeans who are there prepared to back it up.
Liz Ferdinand (08:18):
To follow up on that. A follow up. Thank you, sir. Why not invoke Article Five then for the NATO peacekeeping forces that could potentially be deployed? How does that deter President Putin?
Secretary Hegseth (08:32):
Well, I would say I want to be clear about something as it pertains to NATO membership not being realistic outcome for negotiations. That's something that was stated as part of my remarks here as part of a coordination with how we're executing these ongoing negotiations, which are led by President Trump. All of that said, these negotiations are led by President Trump. Everything is on the table in his conversations with Vladimir Putin and Zelensky. What he decides to allow or not allow is at the purview of the leader of the free world, of President Trump. So I'm not going to stand at this podium and declare what President Trump will do or won't do. What will be in or what will be out. What concessions will be made or what concessions are not made.
(09:19)
I can look as our team has of what's realistic likely on an outcome. I think realism is an important part of the conversation that hasn't existed enough inside conversations amongst friends. But simply pointing out realism, like the borders won't be rolled back to what everybody would like them to be in 2014, is not a concession to Vladimir Putin. It's a recognition of the hard power realities on the ground after a lot of investment and sacrifice, first by the Ukrainians and then by allies. And then a realization that a negotiated peace is going to be some sort of demarcation that neither side wants. But it's not my job as the Secretary of Defense to define the parameters of the President of the United States as he leads some of the most complex and consequential negotiations in the world.
Speaker 2 (10:09):
Sticking with the US press. Let us go with Axios, this Zach Basu. Right in the far right.
Zach Basu (10:17):
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Given the position you've now staked out, what leverage exactly is Ukraine being left with? Especially if the US also plans to wind down into military aid. And then quickly, if a NATO ally is attacked by Russia or any country will the US unequivocally uphold its obligations under Article Five regardless of that country's defense spend?
Secretary Hegseth (10:37):
Well, we've said we're committed to the alliance and that's part of the alliance, right? You point out Article Five, you point out Article Three. It's just a cheap, I'm not saying it's a cheap coming from you, but it's just a cheap political point to say, "Oh, we've left all the negotiating cards off the table by recognizing some realities that exist on the ground." President Zelensky understands the realities on the ground, President Putin understands the realities on the ground, and President Trump as a deal maker, as a negotiator, understands those dynamics as well. By no means is anything that I state here, even though we lead the most powerful military in the world, hemming in the Commander-in-Chief in chief and his negotiations to ultimately decide where it goes or does not go.
(11:22)
He's got all the cards he would like. And the interesting part is oftentimes while the conventional status quo mindset, or the legacy media wants to play checkers, the same checkers game we've been playing for decades, President Trump time and time again finds a way to play chess, as a deal maker, as a businessman who understands how to create realities and opportunities where they otherwise may not exist.
(11:48)
Take for example the conversations that our Treasury Secretary had in recently with President Zelensky, which will continue in Munich with our Vice President and Secretary of State around investments and resources inside Ukraine. I don't want to get ahead of any decision or announcement that could be made there. It could be any number of parameters. But President Trump as a deal maker and a businessman recognizes that an investment relationship with Ukraine ultimately in the long term for the United States is a lot more tangible than any promises or shared values we might have even though we have them. There is something to relationships and deals in real ways, whether militarily or economically or diplomatically that he sees that are possibilities that could forge together a lot of opportunities to show that solidarity that Vladimir Putin will clearly recognize. That's one of any number of other opportunities that this president will leverage in these high-stakes negotiations.
(12:49)
So I just reject on its face the premise that somehow President Trump isn't dealing with a full set of cards when he's the one that can determine ultimately what cards he holds.
Speaker 2 (13:02):
Great. Now, shifting to the international press. We'll take the French wire service, Agence France-Presse with Max Delaney.
Max Delaney (13:19):
Thank you very much, secretary of Defense. You've spoken about trying to force both Putin and Zelensky to the table. Can you give a guarantee that no deal will be forced on Ukraine that they do not want to accept? And also that you will include Europe in the negotiations about an issue that concerns European security? And can you tell us whether the US will continue to supply arms to Ukraine during any negotiations?
Secretary Hegseth (13:50):
Well, to the first part of your question, that's not ultimately my decision. The President will lead these negotiations alongside our Secretary of State, our National Security advisor, and numerous other officials that will be involved. And ultimately we've played our role in talking to our NATO allies about what that would look like.
(14:09)
President Trump, I want to point out, I've got the truths right here that he posted, called both, in case we missed it, Vladimir Putin and President Zelensky. Called them both. Any negotiation that's had will be had with both. I also am very encouraged by what the Secretary General has said here. Clearly attune to the realities of the moment, the need for peace, and that the NATO alliance and European members will play a role in that. Ultimately, President Trump speaking to those two countries is central to the deal being made but it affects a lot of people, of course.
(14:49)
So I am not going to be involved in those intimate diplomatic negotiations. That's for the pros atop the Trump administration who do diplomacy and negotiations. Ultimately, as security assistance we have continued to provide what has been allocated. I think it would be fair to say that things like future funding, either less or more could be on the table in negotiations as well. Whatever the President determines is the most robust carrot or stick on either side to induce a durable peace. Understanding obviously the motivations that Vladimir Putin has had on Ukraine for quite some time. Thank you.
Speaker 2 (15:30):
We'll have a second international press outlet. We'll go with the German paper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung with Dr. Tomasz Kuczka.
Dr. Tomasz Kuczka (15:42):
Thanks a lot. Tomasz Kuczka, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Good afternoon. Mr. Secretary, two questions, please. The first one regarding the new defense investment pledge. When you and President Trump speak about raising it to 5%, do you mean European allies only? Or do you mean the US as well? Which is currently at 3.4% according to NATO statistics. And if the letter is true when do you think the US could possibly reach the goal of spending 5% on defense? That's number one.
(16:18)
Number two, you've said yesterday that Europeans need to take ownership of their own conventional security. So should Europeans expect that ultimately the US would withdraw the bulk of their forces from Europe and just leave in place what is necessary for nuclear deterrence? I know there's a revision going on. I don't expect you to name any numbers, but maybe give us an outlook of what we should expect. Thank you.
Secretary Hegseth (16:48):
Thank you. I think nobody can or should contest the extent of America's willingness to invest in national security. We have a budget of $850 billion spent on defense. I'm in the business of ensuring that every dollar of that is used wisely, which is why we're pushing a Pentagon audit and making sure that we're cutting fat so that we've got more at the tip of the spear. 3.4% is a very robust investment, larger than most of our allies within NATO. Any defense minister or secretary of defense that tells you they wouldn't want more would be lying to you. I understand that. Ultimately we have our own budgetary considerations to be had.
(17:38)
But I don't think an unwillingness of NATO allies to invest in their own defense spending can be dismissed away by trying to point at the $900 billion that America has invested around the globe to include the NATO alliance and saying that's not enough. So ultimately, we are very much committed to the NATO alliance and to our allies. But without burden sharing, without creating the right set of incentives for European countries to invest, then we would be forced to attempt to be everywhere for everybody all the time, which in a world of fiscal restraints is, again, to get back to that word reality, just not reality.
(18:20)
So yes, we will continue to spend robustly. Our expectation of our friends, and we say this in solidarity, is you have to spend more on your defense for your country on that continent, understanding that the American military and the American people stand beside you as we have in NATO. But can't have the expectation of being the permanent guarantor, as I alluded to from what even Eisenhower observed post-World War Two. That shift has to happen. The peace dividend has to end. There are autocrats with ambitions around the globe, from Russia to the communist Chinese. Either the West awakens to that reality and creates combat multipliers with their allies and partners to include NATO, or we will abdicate that responsibility to somebody else with all the wrong values.
(19:15)
You mentioned Europe. We have not said in any way that we're abandoning our allies in Europe. There have been no decisions based on troop levels. Again, that's a discussion to be had by the commander in chief in these high stakes negotiations. And that would most likely come later on. But there is a recognition that the ambitions of the Communist Chinese are a threat to free people everywhere to include America's interests in the Pacific. And it makes a lot of sense just in a common sense way to use our comparative advantages. European countries spending here in defense of this continent, in defense of allies here against an aggressor on this continent with ambitions. That strikes me as the right place to … And I don't say that in a condescending way. I say that in a common sense, practical way. Investing in defense on the continent makes sense.
(20:18)
We support that as well. It also makes sense comparatively and geographically for the United States along with allies in the Pacific, like Japan and South Korea and the Philippines and Australia and others, to also invest in allies and partners and capabilities in the Pacific to project power there in service of deterrence. That deterrent effect in the Pacific is one that really can only be led by the United States.
(20:44)
We wish we could lead everywhere at all times. We will stand in solidarity with allies and partners and encourage everyone to invest in order to have forced multiplication of what we represent but it requires realistic conversations. Those with disingenuous motives in the media, I don't mean to look at you, just saying anyone that suggests its abandonment are trying to drive a wedge between allies that does not exist. We are committed to that NATO alliance. We understand the importance of that partnership. But it can't endure on the status quo forever in light of the threats we face and fiscal realities. Europe has to spend more, NATO has to spend more, has to invest more, and we're very encouraged by what the Secretary General has said. And frankly behind closed doors what a lot of our allies have said as well. Acknowledging that reality.
(21:35)
And that's why when I say make NATO great again, it's what President Trump set out to do in 2017. The press said, "President Trump is abandoning NATO. He's turning his back on our NATO allies." That's what the headlines read in 2017 and 2018. What actually happened? That tough conversation created even more investment to the point where now almost every NATO country is meeting the 2% goal that was said to be egregious when he first said it. Now European countries are stepping up and President Trump continues to ring the alarm bell that even more investment is required considering where we are. So suggestions of abandonment otherwise continue to be disingenuous. And we are proud to be part of this alliance and stand by it. I'll take a couple more. Sure.
Speaker 2 (22:29):
Why don't we take one from a US outlet and one from an international outlet. With the US outlet?
Speaker 7 (22:33):
[inaudible 00:22:35]-
Speaker 2 (22:34):
Pardon me, sir. What we're going to take from the US is Logan Ratick from Newsmax, please,
Logan Ratick (22:41):
Mr. Secretary, you talked about [inaudible 00:22:44] You talked about expanding the defense industrial base and also expediting foreign military sales. Can you expand on that a little bit and how important that is to NATO?
Secretary Hegseth (22:56):
Well, one of the self-evident conclusions of the war in Ukraine was the underinvestment that both the European continent and America has had, unfortunately, in the defense industrial base. The ability to produce munitions emerging technologies rapidly and field them was a blind spot exposed through the aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine has responded to that as we've had a chance to listen to a great deal. Europe is responding to that, and so is America. We have to do more to ensure, whether you call it the arsenal for democracy, or defending the free world, if America can't build and export and build and provide rapid capabilities because we're too stale or static or bureaucratic or the Pentagon is bloated, then we're not able to field the systems we need in the future.
(23:45)
So deep and dramatic reforms are coming at the Defense Department with the leadership of President Trump to ensure that we're investing robustly in our defense industrial base. A great example is shipbuilding. We need to vastly increase our ability to build ships and submarines. Not just for ourselves but to honor obligations to our allies as well. And we will do that.
(24:06)
Foreign military sales is another thing I mentioned this morning with the Secretary General. We have for a long time been the country by with and through that our allies are able to supply major platforms and weapons systems like the F-35 and the Patriots and others. Whatever the system is, we need to reform that process so it's quicker. So a request today isn't delivered seven years from now, but three years from now with less red tape and with the most efficient and effective technology possible. We hear that from our allies. And that's part of being a good faith partner is we're going to invest in our defense industrial base, we're going to make sure foreign military sales are as rapid as possible, which again is a force multiplier for American power, which is something we want to do in a contested world.
Speaker 2 (24:52):
For our final question, we'll go to an international outlet, the Japanese service, NHK, with Sachiyo Sugita, please.
Sachiyo Sugita (24:59):
Sachiyo from NHK, the Japanese TV station. Thank you very much. I would like to ask about China as you mentioned that US will be prioritizing in deterring China. What role will you be expecting Japan and IP4 countries to play in this context?
Secretary Hegseth (25:19):
Sure. I mean, first of all, I would point out that President Trump has expressed a strong relationship with Xi Jinping. We don't have an inevitable desire to clash with China. There's a recognition that there are divergent interests which lead to a need for strength on the American side to ensure our interests are advanced and that ultimately any aggression is deterred. That's a real thing. But we don't feel like conflict is inevitable and certainly don't seek conflict with China and that's why President Trump has that good relationship with Xi Jinping.
(25:51)
But it was prudent for us to work with allies and partners in the Pacific to ensure that that deterrence, hard power deterrence, not just reputational but reality exists. And that's why a lot of my first phone calls as Secretary of Defense were to Pacific allies, to Australia, to Japan, to South Korea, to the Philippines and others, and will continue because that, just as this alliance in Europe is critical, working by, with, and through allies and partners in that region who understand the reality of the ascendant Chinese threat will be critical. It can't be America alone. It won't be America alone if we are to deter that.
(26:32)
So it is a focus. I've articulated that from day one. America achieves strength, whether it's in peace through the Ukrainian conflict or deterring it in the Pacific through strength. There's a reason why Donald Trump emphasizes peace through strength at every moment. My job, my job alone as the Secretary of Defense, is to ensure he has the strongest, most capable, most lethal military possible. Heaven forbid, we have to use it. It's meant and built for deterrence, but if we have to, we can close with and destroy our enemies and bring our men and women home with success as quickly as possible. Thank you very much for being here.
Speaker 2 (27:16):
Thank you, everyone.