Mr. Crawford (00:27):
Once again, good morning everyone. Without objection, the chair may declare the committee in recess at any time. Before we begin today's hearing, I want to provide a few important reminders. First, today's open portion is being broadcast live on C-SPAN and streamed on the committee's YouTube channel. This open portion of the hearing will be conducted entirely on an unclassified basis. All participants are reminded to refrain from discussing classified or other sensitive information protected from public disclosure. I will adjourn this open session following completion of one round of questions and we'll then move into a closed session where such questions can be asked.
(00:58)
Second, I want to inform the audience that while I fully support constitutionally protected free speech and the right to assemble, this is not the time or place. Any would-be disruptors in the audience who interfere with the committee's business will not be tolerated. For this event, members will have five minutes with witnesses. I would ask each of my colleagues to keep both of your questions and complete answers from the witnesses within those allotted five minutes. Any last questions that can't be answered in time will be submitted for the record. In the same manner in which the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has conducted itself in recent worldwide threats hearings, I expect that we will continue to act in a bipartisan and respectful manner during today's event. I'm confident all members can treat each of our witnesses today with due respect consistent with past practice.
(01:43)
This Worldwide Threats hearing provides American people the opportunity to hear directly from our intelligence community leadership on the threats that face our nation. It's my pleasure to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing, Director of National Intelligence, the Honorable Tulsi Gabbard, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable John Ratcliffe, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Honorable Kash Patel, Director of National Security Agency, General Tim Haugh, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse. Thank you all for being here.
(02:13)
First, I want to address an issue that was made public earlier this week regarding a group text message exchange that included several members of President Trump's national security leadership team and a journalist. Yesterday, our colleagues on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held their hearing on the annual threat assessment and unfortunately instead of exploring the real and existential threats that face our nation, which is the purpose of this hearing, this issue consumed most of their time. While I will address this topic further in my questions, it's my sincere hope that we use this hearing to discuss the many foreign threats facing our nation. I have deep concerns about the state of our national security.
(02:45)
The war between Russia and Ukraine has just surpassed three years and now includes North Korean troops on the battlefield. Iran remains the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, supporting terrorist organizations throughout the Middle East like Hezbollah and Hamas, fueling the latter's war with Israel in Gaza. The threat of the Chinese Communist Party or CCP has metastasized worldwide, expanding a robust military and espionage capability well beyond the Pacific, including here within the Western hemisphere. The CCP's aggressiveness in operations below the level of armed conflict continues to grow. For example, they have sponsored cyber attacks against United States' critical infrastructure and even recruited a New York State Governor's office employee into being an undisclosed agent of the CCP.
(03:29)
And after four years of a catastrophic open border policy and limited and in many cases no vetting, we have seen an explosion of illegal migrants crossing our border since 2021. In fiscal year 2024, 516 were identified to be known or suspected terrorists, 106 of whom tried to sneak into our country between ports of entry, and these are just the ones we caught of the nearly 3 million encounters recorded by Customs and Border Protection. We've also seen an ISIS-affiliated human smuggling network bringing more than 400 migrants into the United States, and this occurs through networks associated with cartels and gangs from Sinaloa to CJNG who present an unacceptable risk to the security of the American people.
(04:10)
In the midst of such threats, many have understandably lost trust in the intelligence community. One reason I'm particularly concerned about is a pattern of lapses I've seen in analytic integrity and objectivity in some of the assessments provided by the IC in the last few years. From President Trump-Russia collusion fiasco to the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic to anomalous health incidents, there have been numerous instances of the IC suppressing certain reporting using substandard reporting to support a pre-decided thesis and failure or refusal to consider plausible alternative analyses. That combined with many other examples of weaponized government results in a situation where the United States is facing very real threats, while many of our citizens lack trust in those they empower to inform on or counter these threats.
(04:54)
Look, I've been honored to serve our country for many years now, first, as an explosive ordinance disposal technician in the Army, now as a representative for the first district of Arkansas and chairman of this committee. In my time here, I've traveled the world and met with countless IC employees from everyday Americans doing challenging and often dangerous work of intelligence to agency directors like yourselves. The vast majority of those people are honest, hardworking, patriotic Americans that silently and without accolades do difficult jobs often in austere places, sacrificing time with their families and in some cases putting themselves in danger, all in order to serve the United States. These silent warriors deserve our gratitude and our respect. They do not deserve to have their reputations besmirched by poor leadership.
(05:41)
Unfortunately, in recent years, we've seen instances of politicized self-serving dishonest leaders, staining the reputation of our institutions and patriots by abusing the powers and sacred trust given to them by the American people. We have some real work to do. You in your roles as leaders of prestigious organizations and us as members of this committee charged with conducting honest and rigorous oversight must ensure that our institutions work for the American people. Those that don't uphold the stringent standards of integrity that the American people expect and deserve must be held accountable. In the instances where trust is breached, those involved must be held accountable. This will help rebuild the trust between the American people and those that serve them in the intelligence community.
(06:22)
Today, we need you to be candid about the threats facing the United States. I have deep concerns that many threats have been downplayed or not taken seriously enough for some time, particularly in the homeland and the Western Hemisphere. I look forward to hearing your assessment. Thank you again to our witnesses for being here today and without that, I want to yield to the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Himes, for his opening statement.
Mr. Himes (06:43):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning and welcome to our witnesses. As the chairman said, this hearing is an important opportunity for our committee and the American people to hear directly from the senior leadership of the intelligence community about the threats that our nation faces. I read the unclassified report and I found a lot of continuity in the IC's assessment about critical threats to our national security compared to last year's assessment. The IC continues to see threats from our principal adversaries, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
(07:16)
I must say though, that after these last two months, I'm worried that the call may be coming from inside the house. This report calls Russia "an enduring potential threat to US power, presence, and global interests." But as far as I can tell, we're now on Team Kremlin. We vote with them and against our allies in the United Nations. We humiliate President Zelensky in the Oval Office. The President's chief Russian negotiator, Steve Witkoff is repeating Russian talking points and participating on a madcap Signal chat about an attack on Yemen while inside Russia. USAID is gone and with it, all American soft power. If I had time, I would ask the generals at this table about what it means to our national security to give up our soft power.
(08:11)
We're no longer helping struggling nations in Africa. China or worse terrorists are filling the vacuum. I wonder how many of those African countries will be named in next year's threat assessment. Thanks to DOGE, the men we paid to guard the most vicious ISIS terrorists in the world in Syria walked off the job. Do you think we'll see their names in this document next year? Elon Musk fired the people who maintain our nuclear weapons. Does that feel like a threat to you? Apparently, all of this mayhem is cheered by the President of the United States and by 20 somethings with laptops and nicknames like Big Balls, but I've been doing this for a long time and I know that Moscow and Beijing and Tehran and Pyongyang cannot believe their luck.
(09:06)
Now, we come to learn that people in the most dangerous and sensitive jobs on the planet put extremely specific pre-decisional discussions about a military attack on Signal, which could be intercepted by the Russians and the Chinese. Everyone here knows that the Russians or the Chinese could have gotten all of that information and they could have passed it on to the Houthis who easily could have repositioned weapons and altered their plans to knock down planes or sink ships. I think that it's by the awesome grace of God that we are not mourning dead pilots right now. The two general officers sitting at the table and the people who work for all of you know that if they had set up and participated in the Signal chat, they would be gone and they know that there's only one response to a mistake of this magnitude. You apologize, you own it, and you stop everything until you can figure out what went wrong and how it might not ever happen again, but that's not what happened.
(10:12)
The Secretary of Defense responded with a brutal attack on the reporter who did not ask to be on the Signal chain. Yesterday, our former colleague, Mike Waltz, did the same in the White House and then went on Fox to call Jeff Goldberg a loser. What do you think the people who work for you are seeing and learning from that? Now, except for that last part, almost all of the mayhem, slowly eroding our safety, our standing, and our security in the world has largely happened outside the IC. If you had a part in that, and I suspect you did, I thank you. I'll say it now and I'll say it again. Every time we see each other over the next couple of years, you must protect the thousands of patriots who go to work every day under you to keep us safe.
(11:07)
You need to go to work every day thinking about their morale, their well-being, and their protection. I've done intelligence oversight for more than a decade. It's my job to ask you the tough questions and maybe even make you uncomfortable, but John, I don't ever walk through your lobby and look at those 140 stars on the wall without choking up over the fact that men and women far better than I will give their lives to keep us safe. There's about a dozen people in this room who know all their stories and you know and I know that many of the men and women who have stars on that wall died because of bad decisions or poor judgment by their leaders.
(11:54)
We've all worked together before and recent events notwithstanding, we need you to succeed. Your people and our safety requires you to succeed. I really hope you do, but let me say now that if some over-caffeinated 20-year-old succeeds in firing your linguists or your mathematicians or your paramilitary officers, if you shut down some unit because Steve Bannon or Seb Gorka doesn't like it, America will be less safe and people will get hurt and I and this committee and history will be very unkind.
Mr. Crawford (12:43):
Gentleman yields. I recognize Director Gabbard to make a statement on behalf of the intelligence community.
Director Tulsi Gabbard (12:49):
Thank you very much, Chairman Crawford and Ranking Member Himes. Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity for us to be here to present the 2025 annual threat assessment. I'm joined here by my colleagues from the CIA, DIA, FBI, and NSA. Our testimony today offers the collective assessment of the 18 US intelligence elements making up the US intelligence community and draws on the intelligence collection and information available to the IC from open source and private sector and the expertise of our analysts. It evaluates what the IC assesses most threatens our people and our nation's ability to live in a peaceful, free, secure, and prosperous society.
(13:33)
As you know very well, we face an increasingly complex threat environment that is threatening us here at home and our interests abroad. I'll begin by focusing on what most immediately and directly threatens the United States and the well-being of the American people, the non-state criminal groups and terrorists putting American lives and livelihood at risk. I'll then move on to focus on the key nation-states who have the capability to threaten our security and the interests of the United States. Cartels, gangs, and other transnational criminal organizations in our part of the world are engaging in a wide array of illicit activity, from narcotics trafficking to money laundering, smuggling of illegal immigrants and human trafficking, which endanger the health, welfare, and safety of everyday Americans.
(14:21)
Based on our latest reporting available for the year-long period ending October, 2024, cartels were largely responsible for the deaths of more than 54,000 American citizens due to synthetic opioids. Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations are the main suppliers of illicit fentanyl to the US market and are quickly adapting to enforcement and regulatory pressures by using multiple sources and methods to procure precursor chemicals and equipment primarily from China and India, many of which are dual-use chemicals used in legitimate industries. Independent fentanyl producers are also increasingly fragmenting the drug trade in Mexico. The ready availability of precursor chemicals and ease of making illicit fentanyl have enabled independent actors to increase illicit fentanyl production and smuggling operations in Mexico.
(15:15)
Cartels are profiting from human trafficking and have likely facilitated more than 2 million illegal immigrants encountered by law enforcement at the US southwest border in 2024 alone, straining our vital resources and putting the American people at risk. Criminal groups drive much of the unrest and lawlessness in the Western Hemisphere. They also engage in extortion, weapons and human smuggling, and other illicit and dangerous revenue-seeking operations, including kidnapping for ransom, forced labor, and sex trafficking. While some of these key drivers of migrants are expected to persist, heightened US border security enforcement and deportations under the Trump administration are proving to serve as a deterrent for migrants seeking to illegally cross our borders.
(16:03)
US border patrol apprehensions along the southwest border in January, 2025 dropped 85% from the same period in 2024. Transnational Islamist extremists such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda and affiliated jihadi groups continue to pursue, enable, or inspire attacks against the United States and our citizens abroad and within the homeland to advance their ultimate objective of establishing a global Islamist caliphate. This includes heightened efforts to spread their ideology to recruit and radicalize individuals in the US and the West. While the New Year's Day attacker in New Orleans had no known direct contact with ISIS terrorists, he was influenced and radicalized by ISIS ideological propaganda, as one example. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to call for attacks against the United States as they conduct attacks overseas. These jihadist groups have shown their ability to adapt and evolve, including using new technology and tactics to spread their ideology and recruit new followers. A range of non-state cyber criminals are also targeting our economic interests, our critical infrastructure, and advanced commercial capability for extortion, other coercive pursuits, and financial gain. These actors are using a variety of tactics including phishing, ransomware, and denial-of-service attacks to disrupt our systems and steal sensitive and lucrative information using available technologies and taking advantage of US cyber vulnerabilities. Ransomware actors last year, for example, attacked the largest payment processor for US healthcare institutions and another set of criminal actors conducted cyber attacks against US water utilities.
(17:52)
Some of these non-state cyber actors also operate as proxies for or emulate similar activities being carried out by major state actors. The IC sees China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea engaging in activities that could challenge US capabilities and interests, especially related to our security and economy. They are, in some cases, working together in different areas to target US interests and to protect themselves from US sanctions. At this point, the IC assesses that China is our most capable strategic competitor. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the People's Republic of China seeks to position itself as a leading power in the world stage economically, technologically, and militarily.
(18:35)
Beijing is driven in part by a belief that Washington is pursuing a broad effort to contain China's rise and undermine CCP rule. China's most serious domestic challenge is probably China's slowing economy and the potential instability that could occur if socioeconomic grievances lead to large-scale unrest. Growing economic tensions with the United States and other countries could also weigh on China's plans for economic growth and domestic job creation. China's military is fielding advanced capabilities including hypersonic weapons, stealth aircraft, advanced submarines, stronger space and cyber warfare assets, and a larger arsenal of nuclear weapons. While it appears they would like to develop and maintain positive ties with the United States and the Trump administration to advance its own interests and avoid conflict, China is building its military capability in part to gain an advantage in the event of a military conflict with the United States around the issue of China's efforts towards unification with the Republic of China or Taiwan.
(19:39)
Beijing is advancing its cyber capabilities for sophisticated operations aimed at stealing sensitive US government and private sector information and pre-positioning additional asymmetric attack options that may be deployed in a conflict. China's cyber activities have been linked to multiple high-profile breaches, including last year's massive compromise of US telecom infrastructure, commonly referred to as Salt Typhoon. Beijing currently dominates global markets and strategically important supply chains, for example, with the mining and processing of several critical minerals. In December, China imposed an export ban to the United States on gallium, germanium, and antimony, all of which are important to the production of semiconductors and our defense technologies.
(20:27)
This was in direct response to us export controls on chips designed to broadly limit PRC access to advanced chips and chip-making equipment. China also aims to compete in other critical global industries including AI, legacy semiconductor chip production, biomanufacturing, and genetic sequencing and medical and pharmaceutical supply production. Russia's nuclear and conventional military capabilities along with its demonstrated economic and military resilience make it a formidable competitor. Moscow has more nuclear weapons than any other nation. That could inflict catastrophic damage on the United States and the world in the event of a major war that Russian leaders fear put them and their regime at serious risk.
(21:14)
In late 2024, Russia announced updates to its public nuclear doctrine, expanding the conditions under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Russia is building a more modern and survivable nuclear force designed to circumvent US missile defense through reliable retaliatory strike potential. It intends to deter the US by holding the US homeland at risk and by having the capabilities to threaten nuclear war in a conflict. Russia's developed advanced cyber capabilities and has attempted to pre-position access to US critical infrastructure for asymmetric options and make it a persistent cyber threat. Russia's cyber activities have been linked to multiple high-profile breaches, including the 2023 hack of Microsoft.
(22:02)
Russia is also fielding new capabilities and anti-satellite weapons meant to degrade US and allied space infrastructure. Among Russia's most concerning developments is a new satellite intended to carry a nuclear weapon as an anti-satellite weapon, violating longstanding international law against such activity and putting the US and global economy at risk. Iran continues to seek to expand its influence in the Middle East, despite the degradation to its proxies and defenses during the Gaza conflict. Iran has developed and maintains ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs, including systems capable of striking US targets and allies in the region. They've shown a willingness to use these weapons including during a 2020 attack on US forces in Iraq and in attacks against Israel in April and October, 2024.
(22:54)
Iran's cyber operations and capabilities also present a serious threat to US networks and data. The IC continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program that he suspended in 2003. We continue to monitor closely if Tehran decides to reauthorize its nuclear weapons program. In the past year, we've seen an erosion of a decades-long taboo in Iran on discussing nuclear weapons in public, likely emboldening nuclear weapons advocates within Iran's decision-making apparatus. Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is at its highest levels and is unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons. Iran will likely continue efforts to counter Israel and press for US military withdrawal from the region by aiding, arming, and helping to reconstitute its loose consortium of like-minded terrorist actors, which it refers to as its axis of resistance.
(23:56)
Although weakened, this collection of actors still presents a wide range of threats, including to Israel's population and US forces deployed in Iraq and Syria as well as US and international military and commercial shipping and transit. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is pursuing stronger strategic and conventional capabilities that can target US forces and allies in the region as well as the US homeland to bolster North Korea's leverage and stature, defend its regime, and achieve at least tacit recognition as a nuclear weapons power. Kim's recently cemented strategic partnership with Russia supports these goals by providing him with greater financial, military, and diplomatic support, reducing its reliance on China and providing North Korean forces and weapons systems with warfighting experience.
(24:50)
Kim views his strategic weapons advances, its deepening ties with Russia, and its economic durability as strengthening his negotiating position against Washington's demands for denuclearization and lessening Kim's need for sanctions relief. Since 2022, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have grown closer. Removing the accelerant of the war in Ukraine is unlikely to revert these bilateral relationships to a pre-war 2021 baseline, leaving room for new strategic priorities and world events to create new incentives or challenges to their expanded cooperation.
(25:29)
Russia has been a catalyst for much of this expansion, driven heavily by the support it has needed for its war against Ukraine, including protection from US and Western sanctions. In addition to exchange of military and other resource capabilities with North Korea, Russia has relied more heavily on China's financial and defense industry backing and has increased combined military exercises with China. With Iran, Russia has also expanded financial ties to mitigate sanctions. Iran has become a critical military supplier to Russia, especially of UAVs in exchange for Russian technical support for Iranian weapons, intelligence, and advanced cyber capabilities.
(26:10)
The threats that we see to the US national security are both complex and multifaceted. In closing, I want to address briefly the Signal chat issue that I know many of you are concerned about. The President and National Security Advisor Waltz held a press conference yesterday with a clear message. It was a mistake that a reporter was inadvertently added to a Signal chat with high-level national security principals having a policy discussion about imminent strikes against the Houthis and the effects of the strike. National Security Advisor has taken full responsibility for this and the National Security Council is conducting an in-depth review along with technical experts working to determine how this reporter was inadvertently added to this chat. The conversation was candid and sensitive, but as the President and National Security advisor stated, no classified information was shared. There were no sources, methods, locations, or war plans that were shared. This was a standard update to the National Security cabinet that was provided alongside updates that were given to foreign partners in the region. The Signal app comes pre-installed on government devices. In December of 2024, CISA stated, "We strongly urge highly targeted individuals to immediately review and apply best practices provided in the guidance to protect mobile communications, including consistent use of end-to-end encryption." And they named Signal as an example of such an end-to-end encrypted messaging app.
(27:54)
Ideally, these conversations occur in person. However, at times fast-moving coordination of an unclassified nature is necessary, where in-person conversation is not an option. I'm also aware that a lawsuit was filed yesterday on this issue. As a result of that pending litigation, I'm limited in my ability to comment further on that specific case. My Office of General Counsel will be in close contact with the Department of Justice on this matter. The most important thing to the American people and to all of us is the success of this military operation against terrorists who have been and continue to attack American service members was extremely successful thanks to the leadership of President Trump and the actions of our brave men and women in uniform. As the heads of the American people's Intelligence Community, we will continue to provide the President, you, and Congress and our warfighters with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence to keep our country secure, free, prosperous, and at peace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Crawford (29:04):
Thank you, Director Gabbard. We now turn to member questions. I'll recognize myself for five minutes. Before I get into the threats, I want to talk about something we've talked about in this committee and in this setting before. We've had IC agency leaders commit to complying with our document requests but not follow through. I don't know if this is due to direction from previous administration or middle management obstruction, but I find it completely unacceptable. In fact, I had to subpoena the NSA in order to cooperate with our AHI investigation last year. As you all know, it's the charge of this committee to conduct rigorous oversight and part of that oversight occasionally requires us that we request documents from your organizations to enable our investigations.
(29:50)
We cannot adequately do our jobs without your partnership and your cooperation. General Haugh and General Kruse, we had this conversation here before last year and I'm not satisfied with your responsiveness. Therefore, I'm going to ask that question again on the record in this open setting to each of you. Do I have your unequivocal commitment to cooperating with document or other information requests from this committee? General Haugh?
General Tim Haugh (30:14):
You do, Chairman.
Mr. Crawford (30:15):
Thank you, General Haugh. Director Patel?
Kash Patel (30:18):
You do too, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Crawford (30:19):
Director Gabbard?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (30:21):
Yes, Chairman.
Mr. Crawford (30:22):
Director Ratcliffe?
John Ratcliffe (30:24):
Yes, you do, Chairman and Ranking Member, and I want to start by saying it's good to be back. It's good to see you, and as you all know, I have a special appreciation for the work that this committee does having previously been a member. I also understand the importance of the oversight role that it has, and so you have my full commitment and my understanding about what your responsibilities are and my obligation to keep you fully and currently informed, and I will do that.
Mr. Crawford (30:54):
Appreciate that. General Kruse?
Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse (30:57):
Chairman, of course, you have our continuing support on this critically
Lieutenant General Jeffrey Kruse (31:00):
Critically important effort for the nation.
Mr. Crawford (31:01):
Thank you. I appreciate that. I want to turn now to something that's a topic of conversation and really needs to be, and that's our own neighborhood here in our Western Hemisphere. I mentioned in my opening statement, I'm deeply concerned about encroachment in the Western Hemisphere, not just by China, but other adversaries like Russia and Iran. From Russian military cooperation with, and support to Venezuela and Nicaragua, CCP-linked companies, acquisition of critical assets in Central and South America, Iran's defense agreement with Bolivia, the establishment of a technical military cooperation commission including Venezuela, Cuba, China, Russia, and Iran. And I could list several more alarming examples. I'm afraid we focus so much of our attention across the world that we've lost sight of our own neighborhood leading to the anti-American regimes gaining permanent footholds within striking distance of the Homeland. So Director Gabbard, to the extent that you can discuss it in this setting, what is the intelligence community's assessment of adversary encroachment in the Western Hemisphere?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (32:00):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We'll be able to go into greater detail in the closed session, but the intelligence community assessment reflects what you have just detailed and outlined. The continued competition, encroachment and investments that are occurring in the Western Hemisphere have rapidly increased and continue to pose a threat both to our economic interests and to our security. Every day, there are new reports of further attempts. One just recently that came up yesterday with investments that are being made in the southeast part of the United States. Again, I'll go into this further in a closed setting, but the intelligence assessments that we are receiving are being shared with senior cabinet officials, Department of Energy, Commerce, Treasury. Those who are working alongside us do not only monitor, but to determine the best policies that will protect our interests.
Mr. Crawford (33:06):
Thank you. I want to turn to Director Patel real quick. In the time that I have left, if you can flesh this out for me just a little bit. You indicated something that caught my attention in the proceeding yesterday and that was your involvement with the judicial drug task force that you partner with at the state level, and how that has yielded positive results with regard to cartel activity. Can you put a little finer point on that to describe those partnerships in the 53 seconds we have remaining?
Kash Patel (33:32):
Yeah, I'll try to be brief. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, thanks for having us, Ranking Member. My priorities at the FBI have been to partner with state and local law enforcement in ways that we have not done so before, particularly on information sharing, and it's a two-way street. And in order for us to effectuate drug seizures and narcotics interdictions in the 50 states, we treat them as all border states because that's what's happening. We have an American citizen die of a drug overdose every seven minutes. That is wildly out of control and unacceptable, but the FBI cannot do that mandate and secure the American people from Washington DC. So we're putting resources in the field. We are working with our partners at the state and local level, and we are seeing immediate results as we are seeing in Arkansas, as I outlined yesterday with hundreds of arrests, thousands of pounds of narcotics seized, dozens of weapons, and multiple indictments.
Mr. Crawford (34:19):
Thank you, Director. I'm going to yield and recognize Ranking Member Himes for five minutes.
Jim Himes (34:24):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If there's something I care as much about as the national security of the United States, it's the powers and prerogatives of this Congress and its oversight duties. So I want to spend a minute or so on yesterday's testimony in front of the Senate and direct these questions in particular to Director Patel and Director Gabbard. Yesterday, Senator Heinrich asked, "Did this conversation," referring to the Signal chat, "Include information on weapons packages, targets, or timing?" Director Patel, you said, "Not that I'm aware of." Director Gabbard, you said same answer. This morning we learned that the Signal chat included the following update, forward-looking update, from the Secretary of Defense.
(35:08)
"Time now 1144 Eastern Time, weather is favorable. Just confirmed with CENTCOM, we are go for mission launch. 1215 Eastern Time, F-18 launch, first strike package. 1345, trigger-based F-18, first strike window starts. Target terrorist is at his known location, so should be on time. Also, strike drones launch MQ-9s. 1410, more F- 18 launch, second strike package."
(35:35)
Do either of the directors want to reflect on their testimony yesterday in the context of what I just read?
Kash Patel (35:40):
Sure. One, I was not on that Signal chat. Two, I have not reviewed it. And three, as you just indicated, that was made public this morning.
Jim Himes (35:47):
But Director, you didn't, prior to yesterday's Senate, you were on the Signal chat, correct?
Kash Patel (35:53):
No.
Jim Himes (35:53):
Okay, but did you review the material on the Signal chat?
Kash Patel (35:57):
No, I wasn't on it.
Jim Himes (35:58):
Okay. Director Gabbard?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (36:01):
Yes, Ranking Member. My answer yesterday was based on my recollection, or the lack thereof, on the details that were posted there. I was not, and what was shared today reflects the fact that I was not directly involved with that part of the Signal chat and replied at the end reflecting the effects, the very brief effects, that the National Security Advisor had shared.
Jim Himes (36:27):
So it's your testimony that less than two weeks ago you were on a Signal chat that had all of this information about F-18s, and MQ-9 Reapers, and targets on strike, and you, in that two-week period, simply forgot that that was there. That's your testimony?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (36:41):
My testimony is I did not recall the exact details of what was included there.
Jim Himes (36:48):
That was not your testimony. Your testimony was that you were not aware of anything related to weapons packages, targets, and timing.
Director Tulsi Gabbard (36:56):
As the testimony yesterday continued on, there were further questions related to that, where I acknowledged that there was a conversation about weapons and I don't remember the exact wording that I used, but I did not recall the specific details that were included.
Jim Himes (37:16):
Director Gabbard, you've reasserted that there was no classified information. I think we can all agree that that information shouldn't have been out there. But let me ask you this, are you familiar with the ODNI's classification guidance?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (37:30):
I'm familiar with it.
Jim Himes (37:31):
I've actually got a copy right here. If I read you a part of that guidance, I wonder if you could tell me what the level of classification indicated is. I'm reading from your classification guidance. And the criteria is, "Information providing indication, or advanced warning, that the US or its allies are preparing an attack." Do you recall what your own guidance would suggest that that be classified?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (37:59):
I don't have the specifics in front of me, but it would point to what was shared would fall under the DOD's classification system and the Secretary of Defense's authority to determine what is classified and what is not.
Jim Himes (38:12):
So let me help you because there's a very clear answer, I guess you don't have it, but information providing… This is the ODNI guidance. "Information providing indication or advance warning that the US or its allies are preparing an attack should be classified as top-secret." Do you disagree with that?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (38:29):
I don't disagree with that. I just point out that the DOD classification guidance is separate from the ODNI's classification guidance. Ultimately-
Jim Himes (38:39):
Do you think it would be materially different?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (38:41):
Ultimately the Secretary of Defense holds the authority to classify or declassify.
Jim Himes (38:48):
Do you think it's likely the DOD guidance is materially different from what I just read?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (38:52):
I haven't reviewed the DOD guidance, so I can't comment.
Jim Himes (39:02):
Director Gabbard, a lot of this suggests a lack of sobriety. When there's punch emojis and fire emojis, it's a lack of sobriety. I don't mean that literally, but I have one last question for you because I think people really listen to what you have to say. You, on March 15th, as DNI, retweeted a post from Ian Miles Cheong, who is listed on RT, that's Russia Today's website, as, "A political and cultural commentator who has contributed content to RT since at least 2022." Director Gabbard, you think that it's responsible for you as head of the intelligence community and the principal presidential intelligence advisor to retweet posts from individuals affiliated with Russian state media?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (39:54):
That retweet came from my personal account and I would have to go back to look at the substance of the tweet.
Jim Himes (40:03):
Just so that we don't have a lack of confusion amongst our allies and enemies and us, can I act perhaps that you not think that you should be saying one thing on your personal account, then you say officially?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (40:13):
I maintain my First Amendment rights to be able to express my own personal views on different issues.
Jim Himes (40:19):
Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Crawford (40:20):
Gentleman yields and I recognize the distinguished Vice Chairman General Kelly.
Trent Kelly (40:25):
Yeah, I now, for the first 30 seconds, Mr. Ratcliffe, or Director Ratcliffe, formerly known as Texas from this Mississippi guy. I'd like to give you 30 seconds if you have anything to respond to what Ms. Gabbard just… Director Gabbard, I'm sorry, just said.
John Ratcliffe (40:46):
Well, Mississippi, it's good to see you again and I appreciate the opportunity. There's so much talk about this Atlantic article and about things that were said and that could have happened instead of a focus on what did happen. So my responsibility as CIA director, one of its responsibilities is to kill terrorists, and that's exactly what I did along with President Trump's excellent national security team. That's what we should be focused on.
(41:15)
With regard to that article, I also would appreciate the opportunity to relay the fact that yesterday I spent four hours answering questions from senators as a result of that article that intimating that I transmitted classified information because there were hidden messages. Those messages were revealed today and revealed that I did not transmit classified information and that the reporter who I don't know, I think intentionally intended it to indicate that. That reporter also indicated that I had released the name of an undercover CIA operative in that Signal chat.
(41:53)
In fact, I had released the name of my chief of staff who is not operating undercover. That was deliberately false and misleading and I appreciate the opportunity to reflect that my answers haven't changed. I used an appropriate channel to communicate sensitive information. It was permissible to do so. I didn't transfer any classified information. And at the end of the day, what is most important is that the mission was a remarkable success is what everyone should be focused on here because that's what did happen, not what possibly could have happened.
Trent Kelly (42:32):
Thank you, Director Ratcliffe. Director Patel, thank you for the great job that you've done. So first of all, your coordination and trying to comply with the letter that was sent last year and the year before, asking for the baseball shooting of which… What I got was basically what happened on the field and I was there so I don't need to know that, although no one from the FBI ever talked to me about what happened. They talked to people who were not there. But I appreciate your commitment to getting us the full, unredacted report, or the redactions are to protect innocent people who are not part of the process, not the people who made decisions to classify that as suicide by COP as opposed to an assassination attempt of many members of Congress, of which I was one. Thank you for your commitment, Director Patel, because I know that you will give us what we have asked for so that we can put this to rest. Mr. Wenstrup, myself, and several others, can I get your commitment to do that, Director Patel?
Kash Patel (43:37):
In fact, I just got an update, Mr. Vice chairman, from my team. You'll have all of those materials to you and your committee by the close of business today, or at the latest tomorrow morning.
Trent Kelly (43:47):
And just really quickly, Director Ratcliffe, and I don't want to go over time. I think it's so important for everybody to have their time. Can you tell me the impact that DOGE has had in causing you to fire people you shouldn't have fired, or released people who are instruments of national security, no longer there. Tell me if you've had any impact specifically that DOGE has caused you to lose someone who was necessary for national security.
John Ratcliffe (44:13):
Given the fact that as of this date, no one from DOGE has been on the CIA campus, and I've had no direct communication with DOGE, other than conversations with Elon Musk at cabinet meetings, I would say the impact is zero.
Trent Kelly (44:31):
Director Patel.
Kash Patel (44:34):
I'm in a similar situation. We do work with DOGE on government efficiencies, but I have not seen any negative impacts at the FBI.
Trent Kelly (44:42):
Thank you very much. And Director Gabbard, it's good to see you again, too. I think we were freshmen together, you and I and Director Ratcliffe and I'm here and you guys are there. Have you seen any impact across the whole, I see that DOGE has caused things that you can't respond to?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (45:00):
Thank you, Congressman. It's great to see you all again here. The answer is no. Similar with Director Ratcliffe, DOGE has not been at ODNI. The president understands the essential national security mission that we have, and we are going through our own internal assessments to ensure we are achieving the effects in an efficient way that is responsible to the American taxpayer.
Trent Kelly (45:27):
Yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Crawford (45:28):
Gentlemen yields to Mr. Carson.
André Carson (45:32):
Thank you, Chairman. To the witnesses, many of whom I've worked with in the past. It appears that this year's report omitted any discussion of trends, national concerns like global health, security, infectious diseases, and the role of conflict, violence, and political instability play as drivers of migration. Coupled with the administration's to USAID and other international assistance, particularly health and humanitarian assistance. Won't these reductions and eliminations increase regional instability and volatility in areas already at high risk for threats? Was the IC consulted at all in the decisions to eliminate such critical funding and why weren't these risks included in this year's report?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (46:17):
Thank you for the question, Congressman. The direction that I gave to our National Intelligence Council as they were putting together the annual threat assessment was to focus on the most direct and extreme threats that we face from non-state and state actors. While I acknowledge the factors that you've mentioned, create an environment that our operators and intelligence officials need to be aware of. This year's annual threat assessment was really more targeted to focus on the direct threats that we have the ability to affect and impact. Some of those were included here that you mentioned with regard to the effects and impacts of USAID. That assessment has not yet been done, at least to my knowledge, and was not considered to be included here.
André Carson (47:12):
Director Patel, this year's assessment, sir, confirms a threat I've worked on for a number of years, domestic extremists. Including lone wolves, white nationalists motivated by racial or anti-government grievances, even religious grievances. Mr. Director, a few yes or no questions. Do you, sir, agree that these domestic threats must be addressed as thoroughly as foreign extremists?
Kash Patel (47:37):
All threats like that will be treated equally, yes, sir.
André Carson (47:40):
Is it true, sir, you moved personnel out of the FBI section responsible for countering domestic violent extremists?
Kash Patel (47:47):
I don't believe I did that.
André Carson (47:48):
Is it true, sir, that you've discussed disbanding this section?
Kash Patel (47:53):
I don't believe I've done that.
André Carson (47:56):
Will you pledge today, sir, not to disband this critical section?
Kash Patel (48:00):
I will pledge to you today that any personnel matters that are being worked on currently, once finalized, the congressional notification will be published to your committee.
André Carson (48:09):
Mr. Chairman, I yield back
Mr. Crawford (48:09):
The gentleman yields. Now recognized, the gentleman from Illinois, the former federal prosecutor, Mr. LaHood.
Darin LaHood (48:16):
Well, thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of our witnesses today for your service to our country. And I want to focus my questions this morning on FISA Section 702. And Director Radcliffe, welcome back to the committee. In your confirmation hearing before the Senate, you were asked extensively about FISA and Section 702 and I think laid out a compelling narrative on how, as you described it, "How indispensable it is to national security." And you were also asked about a warrant requirement on Section 702, and your answer to that was, on whether a warrant makes sense on 702, your quote was, "The answer is no. We're talking about national security issues where sometimes minutes matter in the ability to disrupt or interdict the bad actors or to act upon the intelligence that you can gain from that." Director, I wanted to ask you, is that still your belief today regarding the warrant requirement?
John Ratcliffe (49:18):
Congressman, it absolutely is. You've accurately reflected my prior testimony. It is also my testimony the 702 is indispensable to our intelligence picture and the loss of it would be catastrophic to CIA. And the reason that I say that from this position is not only is 50% of all of our critical analysis provided to the president as commander in chief, and the President's daily brief 702 derived. 70% of CIA's success with regard to advanced weapons counter proliferation is the result of 702 collected information. And finally, 90% of CIA's successful interdictions with regard to synthetic drugs like fentanyl are the result of 702 collection. It's absolutely indispensable to the work that CIA does, and I'm glad that you gave me the opportunity to reflect that to this committee.
Darin LaHood (50:23):
Thank you, Director. And just to ask a follow-up on that, as you know, in the House last year when we had our Pfizer reform and Section 702 reform measures put in place, we had a robust debate on the House floor regarding the warrant requirement. It was a very, very close vote. 212 to 212. Director Ratcliffe, what can you tell our members to alleviate and reassure them on again, the harm that a warrant requirement would do to 702?
John Ratcliffe (50:54):
Well, Congressman, it would impose a de facto ban on lawfully querying previously collected data to find threats against US persons and government officials. So that would be, again, catastrophic to our efforts to keep our community safe. And I would also point out, because I know that these are legitimate concerns with regard when we talk about FISA and 702 specifically, everyone on this committee recalls that when I was a member, I also called out FISA abuses when they occurred. And I don't want there to be any violation of Americans' civil liberties and Fourth Amendment rights, but I would point to the CIA's frankly impeccable record of compliance and we can talk about that more in a closed session.
Darin LaHood (51:50):
Thank you, Director. Director Patel, I want to turn to you. Similar in your Senate confirmation, you were asked extensively about 702 and as you know in our bill that we passed last year, we put lots of reforms and changes and protocols in place for the FBI. And I know that you're supportive of many of those. Specifically on the impracticalities of a warrant requirement on 702, you were quoted as saying, when you were asked about it, "It is almost impossible to make that function of the warrant requirement work and to serve the national no-fail mission." Is that still your testimony here today?
Kash Patel (52:25):
It's great to see you, Congressman, and yes, that's my testimony.
Darin LaHood (52:27):
Thank you. As you know, the reforms that we put in place were significant. Requiring the FBI personnel to get a supervisor or attorney approval to conduct US person inquiries. Requiring high-level approvals up to the FBI deputy director level before certain queries are conducted on US elected or appointed officials, candidates, or media personnel. Requiring the Department of Justice to audit all US person queries performed by the FBI within six months of each query. Reducing the number of FBI personnel we have the ability to query. Can you talk about the current implementation of those reforms and how that's going, Director Patel?
Kash Patel (53:05):
Absolutely. With probably the most prescient one, in terms of 702 query reviews, we only have about 200 left when it comes to US persons, and we will promulgate those findings to you. But as of today, of all the US persons queried in the 702 databases, there's only been one instance of negligent conduct. We have already implemented limited access to those who actually know how to use the FISA process in 702. And we have implemented a direct reporting structure to the office of director and the deputy director to make sure that anyone, anyone, whether it's intentional or unintentional, abuses the 702 query system, is brought to our attention immediately and we will take that on for action directly.
(53:47)
And in terms of, piggybacking off Director Radcliffe, the public defender in me realizes the importance of constitutional due process more than anyone. The staffer in me from the House Intelligence Committee may be the only person who has worked more on FISA reform and exposing FISA abuse in modern congressional history. And the terrorism prosecutor in me and the JSOC civilian in me tells me that we cannot do away with 702 or FISA Title I and Title III, but we can work with you and your committee to make it better. I don't know all those ideas. I don't have all those answers, but you have my commitment that we will use it appropriately going forward.
Darin LaHood (54:21):
Thank you. Director, I yield back.
Mr. Crawford (54:22):
Gentlemen yields. Mr. Castro.
Joaquin Castro (54:24):
Thank you, Chairman. Tulsi, you and I came into the Congress together in 2013. And Kash, you and I, I was serving on the intelligence committee when you worked on the intelligence committee. And John, you and I are both from Texas and we both served together on the intelligence committee. The idea that this information, if it was presented to our committee, would not be classified, y'all know is a lie. That's ridiculous. I've seen things much less sensitive be presented to us with high classification. And to say that it isn't is a lie to the country. I want to ask the generals now. The NSA is principally in charge of intercepting things like signals intelligence from other countries. General, I want to ask you. If your organization, your agency, intercepted something like this from Russia or China or some other country, would you consider this classified information?
Timothy D. Haugh (55:25):
Representative, we would be classifying based off of our sources and methods. So those would be the things that, in terms of how we process, how we would be able to obtain the information and how we'd report it, we would classify based off of our source and methods.
Joaquin Castro (55:39):
So if you knew that the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Advisor of Russia or China and the Head of the Foreign Ministry and all of the folks who were associated with that Signal chain, if you intercepted that information, General, would you consider it classified?
Timothy D. Haugh (55:57):
So it would be classified based off of our collection.
Joaquin Castro (56:00):
So the NSA would classify it, would determine it as classified?
Timothy D. Haugh (56:04):
Based off of the protection of our own source and method, not necessarily based off the content, but how we collected that information.
Joaquin Castro (56:11):
But it would be classified.
Timothy D. Haugh (56:15):
Well, we certainly wouldn't be collecting on a US person conversation [inaudible 00:56:20] on a-
Joaquin Castro (56:20):
No, I understand. I'm saying if you did your job and collected it from the Russian Foreign Ministry and the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of Defense and the President's chief advisor, there is no way, no way, having sat on this committee for nine years, that somebody would come in with that information, and give us something that says unclassified, you can walk out of this room with this information and give it to whomever you want. With all respect, you and I worked on the committee at the same time, Tulsi you and I came in together. I've never had an issue or beef with you. John, you and I are both from Texas. Y'all know that's a lie. It's a lie to the country. I want to ask about the Alien Enemies Act really quick, while I have time. The President has used the Alien Enemies Act, a wartime authority last used to detain German and Japanese nationals during World War II, to summarily deport people accused of being members of the Venezuelan gang, Tren de Aragua.
(57:23)
To invoke this law, the President must demonstrate that the United States is under invasion by a foreign nation or government. They have alleged that we are under invasion by the Venezuelan government. The idea that we are at war with Venezuela would come as a surprise to most Americans. The unclassified version of the annual threat assessment the intelligence community just released, makes no mention of any invasion or war that we are fighting with the nation of Venezuela. You would think our nation being at war would merit at least a small reference in this threat assessment. And Director Ratcliffe, does the intelligence community assess that we are currently at war, or being invaded by the nation of Venezuela?
John Ratcliffe (58:06):
We have no assessment that says that.
Joaquin Castro (58:09):
Thank you. In invoking the law, the president alleged that Tren de Aragua is undertaking hostile actions against the US at the direction, clandestine or otherwise, of the Maduro regime in Venezuela. Director Gabbard, does the intelligence community assess that the Venezuelan government is directing Tren de Aragua's hostile actions against the United States?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (58:34):
There are varied assessments that came from different intelligence community elements. I'll defer to Director Patel to speak specifically to the FBI assessment.
Joaquin Castro (58:49):
Well, let me ask you, so you're saying there are conflicting assessments that have come from the ICD?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (58:54):
That's correct.
Joaquin Castro (58:56):
Okay, thank you. We'll take it up in closed session. All right. You know, your threat assessment makes issue of, highlights fentanyl trafficking as a top threat to the United States, yet support for law enforcement cooperation with Mexico has been put on hold and there has been a threat of invasion to Mexico by the United States. You assess that Russia's advanced cyber capabilities make it a persistent counterintelligence cyber threat, yet the administration shut down the unit at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency tasked with stopping Russian cyber attacks. There are so many other ways that the actions of this administration have contradicted this threat assessment and the administration is making the world, and the United States, more dangerous. I yield back.
Mr. Crawford (59:45):
The gentleman yields. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Fitzpatrick.
Brian Fitzpatrick (59:48):
Thank you, Chairman Crawford. Thank you to all of our witnesses for being here. I look forward to working with each and every one of you to keep our country and our planet safe. I wanted to carry on on the topic of Section 702 reauthorization. Representative LaHood and I did a lot of work on this over the past two years. As you all know, last Congress, this committee worked in a bipartisan manner to advance the reauthorization of what most of us, if not all, deemed to be our country's single most important national security tool. The result was what was titled The Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act, which not only reauthorized section 702, but equally important it provided necessary reforms to our intelligence community in an effort to address past abuses. This was the largest single reform of the FBI and the IC in a generation, making sure that there are appropriate compliance guardrails that enhance accountability while still protecting the critical tools necessary for our nation's security.
(01:00:49)
Just to name a few. In 2009, Section 702 protected our nation from an attack by an al-Qaeda member who intended to detonate explosives in the Manhattan subway lines. In 2014, Section 702 helped prevent attacks by assisting in the removal of ISIS leader Haji [inaudible 01:01:08]. In 2022, Section 702 contributed to the US government's operation against the last remaining 9/11 architect, Ayman al-Zawahiri. And as we saw in the horrendous attacks of October 7th, an attack on the people of Israel, where Hamas killed over 1,200 innocent civilians, intelligence collection is essential to the safety and security of our population. We must never, ever see another attack the likes of 9/11, especially as a result of a self-inflicted intelligence failure. Not reauthorized in the use of this authority in this coming year, would intentionally and willingly put the United States at a disadvantage against actors who seek our destruction. Representative LaHood touched on the wire requirement. As you all know, that is really the linchpin here. And I think it's abundantly clear for members of this committee,
Brian Fitzpatrick (01:02:00):
Committee members of this Congress and for members of our intelligence committee to understand that a warrant requirement is on the collection of data, a warrant requirement cannot apply to the querying of already lawfully collected data. To follow that theory to its logical extreme would be to say that a police department who has an evidence locker containing lawfully collected data has to get a warrant to reenter that evidence locker. It'd be akin to say to a police officer they cannot run a license plate, which is querying off of lawfully collected Department of Transportation data without getting a warrant. It would shut down the courts, it would shut down law enforcement. It would make our country much less safe. So I want to ask Director Patel, Director Ratcliffe, I want to yield the floor to you as we will be working with all of you, particularly your two agencies on reauthorization to share your thoughts.
Kash Patel (01:02:55):
So it's great to see you sir, and thanks for the question. Look on 702, just to flesh out some of the more specific operational use that I have, which specifically relates to what you just said. When I was a terrorism prosecutor, we used 702 directly to prevent the shopping mall in Houston from being blown up. We used 702 collection directly to prevent an attack on the state capitol in the state of California and those individuals were prosecuted and are currently in prison. And balancing that awesome responsibility with the constitutional protections that every American should have when we're talking about US persons specifically is something that I keep in mind on every single decision surrounding 702.
(01:03:34)
But as Director Ratcliffe stated and has been my experience, while I understand and appreciate the concerns for the warrant requirement based on US persons, if there is a solution that allows that to happen in real time, then we can have that discussion. But I have not encountered one and thus it obviates the need in my perspective, in my mission set to protect the American people in hunt down criminals in its application. So where it is now with the reforms y'all have implemented, we've done a great job on protecting American civil liberties and I'm always open to and I do believe we can do some more.
Brian Fitzpatrick (01:04:10):
Director Ratcliffe.
John Ratcliffe (01:04:12):
Good to see you again, Congressman. I agree with Director Patel's comments with regard to that. I'll start out by saying, obviously in this role, I'm not a policymaker, but at the appropriate time, when this comes up for renewal, I think I made it clear and we'll make it clear from the CIA's perspective, the indispensability of 702 as a tool to providing the Commander-in-Chief an accurate picture of the threat environment. You mentioned some examples of 702 success. When we get into the classified session later this afternoon, I have some further examples of a 702 success that we can talk about, and I think that reflects my position.
Brian Fitzpatrick (01:05:03):
Thank you all. I yield back.
Rep. Crawford (01:05:05):
Gentleman yields. Mr. Krishnamoorthi.
Rep. Krishnamoorthi (01:05:10):
Good morning. Thank you Mr. Chair, and thank you to our witnesses for coming. Thank you for your service. Director Gabbard, you said no classified information was included in the signal chat, correct?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:05:22):
That's correct.
Rep. Krishnamoorthi (01:05:23):
And President Trump also said there was no classified information in the Signal chat and Secretary Hegseth said, "Nobody was texting war plans. There was absolutely no classified info in that chat." Lieutenant General Kruse, I'd like to talk to you about a couple things real quick. Executive order 13526 section 1.4A, this is the Trump Administration's executive order with regard to classified information. It says, "Information shall be classified if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security including military plans, weapons systems, or operations." You don't disagree that that's accurately quoted, right?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:06:08):
That's an accurate quote from the executive order.
Rep. Krishnamoorthi (01:06:11):
And DOD 5200.01, this is the DOD's manual on classification says, "Information shall be classified if its unauthorized disclosure, could reasonably be expected to cause describable damage to national security. This includes military plans, weapons systems, or operations." You don't disagree that I quoted that accurately, right?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:06:35):
That's also an accurate quote.
Rep. Krishnamoorthi (01:06:38):
I'd like to show you the text that Secretary Hegseth actually published to the world. Now, Lieutenant General Kruse as Ranking Member Himes said, it says, "Time now weather is favorable, just confirmed with CENTCOM. We are a go for mission launch." Then it says at 12:15 Eastern F-18's launch, first strike package." F-18s are military systems, correct? Weapons systems?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:07:08):
They are.
Rep. Krishnamoorthi (01:07:09):
Okay. 13:45 "Trigger based F-18, first strike window starts. Target terrorist is at his known location, so should be on time. Also, strike drones launch MQ-9s." MQ9 is a weapons system, correct?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:07:26):
They are.
Rep. Krishnamoorthi (01:07:27):
Okay. I think applying the executive order as well as the DOD manual to this fact pattern, we clearly have weapons systems that have been identified that is classified information. Now the reason why it's important that this information not be disclosed is that we don't want the adversaries to know what's about to happen. Right, sir?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:07:51):
Well, I would draw a small distinction there. You referenced and asked if that platform, those two platforms are weapons systems. They are, but those terms are used all across the globe in a lot of context. So it's really about how they're used in the context of this particular document. I just want to clarify that the use of those-
Rep. Krishnamoorthi (01:08:09):
I understand. In this situation, those are operational details?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:08:16):
They are operational details, but again, as you've quoted the DOD instruction, it's about operations. So as you further go down into what are the operational details, I think as we had a discussion yesterday, the important aspect, I think all of us are very familiar. We've-
Rep. Krishnamoorthi (01:08:30):
This is classified information. This is classified information. It's a weapon system as well as sequence of strikes, as well as details about the operations. And so I think that just piggybacking off of what some other members have said, using the DOD's manual as well as the executive order in operation today with the Trump administration, this text message is clearly classified information. Secretary Hegseth has disclosed military plans as well as classified information. He needs to resign immediately. He needs to resign immediately and a full investigation needs to be undertaken with regard to whether other similar Signal chats are occurring in this administration.
(01:09:19)
I'd like to turn my attention to another topic. Director Patel, according to the DOJ in 2022, the FBI led Joint Terrorism Task Force, JTTF in my hometown of Chicago, valiantly led efforts to prevent a plot to attack Naval Station Great Lakes in Illinois. You don't dispute that, do you, sir?
Kash Patel (01:09:39):
I'm not familiar with it, but I don't dispute what you're telling me.
Rep. Krishnamoorthi (01:09:41):
Thank you. A memo obtained by ABC7 News of Chicago said that this task force will now be "actively supporting" the Department of Homeland Security and its immigration enforcement. You don't dispute that either, do you?
Kash Patel (01:09:55):
I'm just not familiar with it, sir.
Rep. Krishnamoorthi (01:09:57):
Okay. Sir, I just have to say the DOJ has now tasked JTTFs to shift some resources to immigration enforcement efforts. And I don't say this lightly. If there's a terrorist attack anywhere in the country, including in Chicago, and it was because the JTTFs in part shifted resources, there'll be hell to pay. Thank you.
Rep. Crawford (01:10:19):
Gentleman's time is expired. Gentlemen from Georgia, Mr. Scott.
Rep. Scott (01:10:22):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Gabbard, was the target terrorist named in the text or was it simply referred to as Target terrorist?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:10:30):
The target was not named.
Rep. Scott (01:10:33):
Thank you. Was the location named?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:10:37):
Congressman, no. No locations were named.
Rep. Scott (01:10:40):
Thank you. Director Patel, there was a specific accusation made about how close we are working with Mexico currently. My understanding and I want to congratulate you on this and I think it shows a shift of focus at the FBI since you've taken over to what it should have been doing all along, which is chasing the 10 most wanted that are threatening our country. My understanding is that two of the three were actually arrested in Mexico and are being extradited back to the United States. Is that correct?
Kash Patel (01:11:14):
Yes, sir. We have been working, one of the first meetings I took as FBI director was my counterpart, Secretary Harfuch in Mexico. And subsequent to that we have extradited or expelled from Mexico two top 10 of the FBI's most Wanted list and 33 other criminals.
Rep. Scott (01:11:32):
Well, it sounds to me like we're working closer with them today than we have in the last several years, and that the focus of the FBI has shifted to actually protecting American citizens instead of arresting pro-life protesters.
Kash Patel (01:11:47):
Our mission is to find violent criminals wherever they are, and if they're in Mexico, we're going to get them.
Rep. Scott (01:11:52):
Thank you, and I appreciate you and I appreciate the change in the focus of the FBI. I want to talk with you a little about the counterintelligence threats, one of which was an active duty US Army soldier charged with conspiring to transmit national defense information to individuals located in China. What can you say in this setting, or can you briefly explain your work with interagency partners to identify and neutralize the counterintelligence threats in the United States around this example?
Kash Patel (01:12:31):
For me, sir?
Rep. Scott (01:12:32):
Yes, sir.
Kash Patel (01:12:33):
So generally speaking on counterintelligence and countering espionage, whether it's from adversaries like the CCP, Russia, Iran, or otherwise, we have prioritized them as an equally violent criminal enterprise seeking to do harm to our critical infrastructure and also to exploit and steal our data, whether it's government or private personnel. And so we have expanded our resources into them and working with the interagency to make it a priority.
Rep. Scott (01:13:00):
Okay. Thank you. I want to move on to the issue of the threshold of parole under the previous administration and the number of illegal immigrants that have come into this country, including people with known membership in terrorist groups. For those individuals that pose a risk and that we have captured and are being deported, are we sharing the biometric and biographic information with our allies to mitigate their ability to relocate or operate abroad?
Kash Patel (01:13:32):
What we are doing at the FBI is sharing the information we're allowed to with our Five Eye partners, and then on an individual basis, we are trying to share information with other partners who deemed individuals that they find of consequence.
Rep. Scott (01:13:48):
Okay. As you move further into your position, if you have additional recommendations on how we better share information, please let us know.
Kash Patel (01:13:56):
Yes, sir.
Rep. Scott (01:13:56):
Director Ratcliffe, China's influence on the Panama Canal has increased since 2017. Panama became the first Latin American country to sign on to China's Belt and Road Initiative. Can you talk about not just China embedding itself into the various canal related sectors and operations, but what other areas in Central and South America if China and others increase their presence and what examples concern you the most?
John Ratcliffe (01:14:22):
Thanks, Congressman. Appreciate the question and I do want to comment the question before about cooperation with Mexico. It's really across the IC when Mexico's Secretary General Omar Harfuch, head of Mexican security was here. He not only met with Director Patel, he met with Director Gabbard and he met with me. So we have been working on that, again, to the benefit of both our countries. To your point, the PRC throughout Central and South America continues to attempt to use its soft power to gain a foothold. They use direct aid to countries that need it. They also provide funding to universities to get a foothold to create influence. And you mentioned the Panama Canal and you've seen the diplomatic efforts of the administration to address that and push back on PRC ownership of the canal locks. But that ties into what the IC is doing.
(01:15:32)
In these instances, it's important for us Congressmen to, the best way we can operate is to provide intelligence to countries in Central and South America, to provide them with briefings, which we do. To provide them with tailored analysis of our intelligence about how China is manipulating them, about how China is hacking them, the things that China is doing to gain a foothold and Russia and Iran throughout that area. So the CIA is very much focused on that.
Rep. Crawford (01:16:05):
Gentleman's time is expired. Mr. Crow.
Rep. Crow (01:16:07):
Thank you, Chairman. General Haugh, the NSA recently warned its employees not to use the Signal app. Is that correct?
General Timothy Haugh (01:16:16):
What we did, Congressman, is we put out cybersecurity advisories on a whole host of systems-
Rep. Crow (01:16:24):
On the Signal app that was included in that advisory, right?
General Timothy Haugh (01:16:28):
What we've done is we've put out an advisory on how to use the Signal app and other encrypted applications because we do encourage our employees and their families to use [inaudible 01:16:38]
Rep. Crow (01:16:37):
Because there's risk to that app?
General Timothy Haugh (01:16:39):
There are.
Rep. Crow (01:16:40):
Okay. General Kruse, DOD also issued a warning about vulnerabilities to the Signal app recently, correct?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:16:50):
That's correct.
Rep. Crow (01:16:51):
Okay. Director Gabbard, you were on the Signal text chain in question, correct?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:16:58):
Yes.
Rep. Crow (01:16:59):
As was Mr. Witkoff, the administration's lead negotiator with the Russians, correct?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:17:05):
Yes.
Rep. Crow (01:17:06):
And at the time, Mr. Witkoff was actually in Russia during this chat discussion, was he not?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:17:12):
I was not aware of that.
Rep. Crow (01:17:16):
Was he on his personal phone at the time?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:17:18):
I don't know.
Rep. Crow (01:17:19):
Well, it's my understanding that he was indeed in Russia. Director Gabbard, you were also traveling during this discussion, correct?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:17:26):
Yes.
Rep. Crow (01:17:27):
And where were you?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:17:29):
I was traveling through the Asia Pacific region. I don't recall which country I was in at that time.
Rep. Crow (01:17:35):
You don't remember the country?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:17:37):
I'd have to go back and look at the schedule.
Rep. Crow (01:17:42):
Director Gabbard, I want to direct your attention again to the text chain where it says, "Just confirmed with CENTCOM, we are a go for mission launch." Does that indicate to you that there is about to be a military operation?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:17:59):
Yes.
Rep. Crow (01:18:00):
Director Gabbard, earlier in this hearing, we heard about the DOD's classification standards. I want to now turn my attention to your classification standards. You are the Director of National Intelligence. The office of the Director of National Intelligence Classification Guide says "Information providing indication or advanced warning that the US or its allies are preparing for an attack" is to be classified as top secret. Are you familiar with that?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:18:28):
Yes.
Rep. Crow (01:18:32):
Director Gabbard, have the Houthis indicated an ability to shoot down American aircraft?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:18:37):
Yes.
Rep. Crow (01:18:38):
They have in fact done so, haven't they?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:18:40):
Yes.
Rep. Crow (01:18:41):
Including MQ-9 Reapers, haven't they?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:18:43):
That's correct.
Rep. Crow (01:18:43):
And that was one of the systems used in the attack recently. That's the subject of this discussion. Is it not?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:18:49):
Correct.
Rep. Crow (01:18:52):
General Kruse, are you familiar with this system?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:18:57):
I'm not wearing my glasses at the moment, but-
Rep. Crow (01:18:59):
I'll help you out. This is an SA-3 anti-aircraft system.
Jeffrey Kruse (01:19:02):
Correct.
Rep. Crow (01:19:04):
Are you familiar with this next system?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:19:12):
I am.
Rep. Crow (01:19:12):
What is it?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:19:20):
I'm going to have to ask you-
Rep. Crow (01:19:20):
It's an SA-6.
Jeffrey Kruse (01:19:20):
I'm going to guess that-
Rep. Crow (01:19:21):
This is also an advanced anti-aircraft system. Is it not?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:19:24):
It was used widely in the Balkans in the '90s. Correct.
Rep. Crow (01:19:28):
And the Houthis also have this system, don't they?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:19:30):
They certainly do.
Rep. Crow (01:19:31):
And they've employed it against our aircraft, have they not?
Jeffrey Kruse (01:19:35):
They have attempted to. Correct.
Rep. Crow (01:19:41):
I spent my life in service to this country. I deployed three times to combat in service to this nation. I learned in that in service that responsibility is core to leadership. You accept responsibility when things go wrong. You admit mistakes. You set the standard from the very top. It is completely outrageous to me, completely outrageous to me that the administration officials come before us today with impunity, no acceptance of responsibility, excuse after excuse after excuse. But we send our men and women downrange to do incredibly difficult, incredibly dangerous things on our behalf, and yet nobody is willing to come to us and say, "This was wrong. This was a breach of security and we won't do it again." It is outrageous and it is a leadership failure, and that's why Secretary Hegseth, who undoubtedly transmitted classified sensitive operational information via this chain must resign immediately. There can be no fixes. There can be no corrections until there is accountability. And I'm calling on the administration to move forward with accountability. I yield back.
Rep. Crawford (01:21:02):
Gentleman yields. Gentleman from Texas, Mr. Crenshaw.
Rep. Crenshaw (01:21:07):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here. Good to see many of you again, and thank you for enduring two long days. I will note I always use fire emojis when I see terrorists getting killed. And I want to talk about cartels. This is a subject that is near and dear to my heart, investigating it thoroughly for the last couple of years, and I'm glad to see that it's mentioned in all of your opening statements, mentioned at the very beginning of the threat assessment. There's a lot to work on here. One of our task force, we had a cartel task force in Congress. One of our key findings was that there needs to be a centralized, maybe call it authority or maybe call it office, maybe call it cartel czar within the administration that actually coordinates all the very different aspects of fighting this battle. Has anything like that been talked about? I'll give you Director Gabbard.
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:22:04):
Thank you, Congressman. It's good to see you again. This is very much central to the conversations and planning and execution of the president's focus on targeting the cartels and the threats that they pose to the American people. Homeland security task forces are being set up that include across the government integration. I can speak from my standpoint, from the intelligence community and our National Counterterrorism Center is leaning heavily forward into gathering and consolidating and integrating the intelligence that comes from DEA and others who've been working this issue for a while to make it so that it can be shared and integrated through the federal, state, and local law enforcement equities who are going after this problem.
Rep. Crenshaw (01:22:53):
Yeah, we'll talk a lot more about that exact thing in closed session, but at a higher level, our recommendation is there needs to be someone at a much higher level that coordinates state DOD, CIA, FBI, Homeland. It's a massive problem. One, I'm all too familiar with. Director Patel, the FBI is tasked with working foreign corruption charges. In the past administration, FBI told me they actually don't focus on Mexico very much because, now in their defense they say the reason is because they won't get anything out of it, because they don't have a cooperative government to work with. I think a lot has changed. Do I have your commitment that we will at least start following up on those? Because the judiciary system in Mexico is a key component in our failures to address the cartels.
Kash Patel (01:23:37):
You do, Congressman. Apologies for not getting back to you sooner.
Rep. Crenshaw (01:23:41):
You're good. Appreciate it. I also want to ask you that the FBI has disrupted an alarming number of terrorist attacks in the last year, last two years. Great on the FBI for doing that. I don't think many Americans realize how good the FBI has been at this. But this also gets to the conversation earlier about FISA 702. One of the main arguments, I wanted to argue with my colleagues on this was when you have a warrant process for the query, what you'll fail to do is connect the dots between the domestic and the international threat. And those connections are there as we see all the time. Would you agree with that? That we need to maintain that process in a responsible way, of course.
Kash Patel (01:24:30):
I do, sir.
Rep. Crenshaw (01:24:31):
I appreciate that. Director Gabbard, in my remaining time, I want to ask you, because of my, and this may go to General Kruse as well, because of my work on energy and commerce, we have an issue there with broadband spectrum auctions. And of course, this affects our intelligence community in a very large way and in our DOD. Getting right to the question here, how much, if any, spectrum can the DOD give up without having a significant effect on the administration's prioritization of lethality and deterrence?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:25:07):
I'll defer to General Kruse specific to DOD.
Jeffrey Kruse (01:25:11):
I certainly wouldn't want to speak for all of DOD, and I think the committee is already in a fantastic conversation with the DOD on that issue. But broadly what I would say is DOD has laid out the portions of the spectrum that it believes for both operational capabilities and in closed session. I am more than happy to walk you through from the intelligence portion of the mission that we do. There are two different portions of the spectrum. We often talk about one but not the other. And in closed session, I'd be more than happy to tell you why the other portion of the spectrum is important in national security.
Rep. Crenshaw (01:25:42):
Sure. And the details are obviously classified but we can talk about X and S spectrums and get a better idea for the public about, because the public would benefit from telecom having the ability to use some of these when we look at 5G networks, 6G networks. So it's a conversation that we need to have in a much longer time to do so, which I've run out of. So I yield back. Thank you.
Rep. Crawford (01:26:04):
Gentlemen yields. Dr. Bera.
Dr. Bera (01:26:05):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I associate myself with the comments of my colleague, Congressman Crow. I'm deeply disappointed in how we're handling this breach of protocol and so forth. Every year at the beginning of Congress, we take an oath to office. This is an awesome responsibility to be a member of Congress, to protect our country. We have no greater responsibility than to protect our homeland. And when I walk into this committee and the honor being on this committee, I don't see Democrats and Republicans. I see folks that every day want to do the same thing. But as Congressman Crow suggested, the mark of leadership, and we all are leaders in this room, is to accept responsibility when mistakes happen. And that Signal chat was a mistake. I'm not here to impugn your character. You were all nominated by the president. You were all confirmed by the president.
(01:27:05)
But we have an awesome responsibility and incredible responsibility to the American people. And then given that we are the United States of America, we have a responsibility to the world. And this really was a breach of protocol. I'll take you at your word that we are going to do a full investigation of it. Our responsibility as Oversight is to understand this breach, understand who leaked information, how that happened, and then hold those responsible. I 100% agree with the Chairman in his opening statement, he said, "[inaudible 01:27:40] trust is breached. Those responsible need to be held accountable." So do I have and Director Gabbard, we serve together, we came into Congress together. Do I have your word, when this investigation is fully completed, we will get the full breadth of the investigation?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:28:01):
Thank you, Congressman. That would be my intent. I will caveat that by saying that this is being conducted by the National Security Council. I've not gotten any indication that they would try to withhold that, but I can't speak for them.
Dr. Bera (01:28:14):
Okay. I also, I see way too much politics when it comes to our national security and international defense. We've got to keep politics out of this. We're not Democrats or Republicans. We're Americans. We're tasked with the responsibility of keeping our country safe. Director Gabbard, you have an awesome responsibility here to advise the President, to collate all the information, everything that the IC is providing and provide that best advice and guidance to the President of the United States. We have to keep politics out of this. Even if the President disagrees with this, if it goes against his personal wishes, if he's considering an order that potentially is unconstitutional or illegal or compromises our security, I want your word that you will always provide and give that honest advice to the President, even if it'll make him angry.
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:29:13):
Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate the question because as you said, I do take this responsibility very seriously and it was my commitment to the President, to the Senate and the American people that as the Director of National Intelligence, I will ensure to provide the President and all of you as policymakers with that unbiased, relevant, and timely intelligence. And to your specific question, the answer is yes. I will inform the President of that accurate, timely, unbiased intelligence reporting. Whether it is something that agrees with an assumption or a view or an objective or not, that's my responsibility to him and to the American people.
Dr. Bera (01:29:53):
Great. I would just offer advice. In your role, what you do on your personal devices versus your official devices, you're speaking to the public. And I would just offer, as I conduct myself, what I say personally is always going to be considered Congressman Bera saying it. General Haugh, I've appreciated working with you and have a deep concern about our cyber vulnerabilities, and we will go into some of this in the closed session, but Salt Typhoon is something we take very seriously as well as Volt Typhoon and the compromises. Can you just briefly give us an update of where we are with those two?
General Timothy Haugh (01:30:38):
So Congressman, we share your concern in terms of the overall ensuring that we can protect the critical infrastructure of the United States. The area that we have been deeply focused on is our ability to partner with industry. 99% of our critical infrastructure is controlled by our industry. So our ability to bring government information to be able to understand what threats look like and the origin of those threats, help inform how industry can defend and also create the necessary equipment to ensure that we're secure. That partnership continues to grow. And that's really one of our key priorities. And I'll be able to go in close session into more detail about the specific actions we've done together as an interagency with our industry teammates.
Dr. Bera (01:31:26):
Right. Thank you. I yield that.
Rep. Crawford (01:31:27):
Gentleman yields. Gentleman from Pennsylvania, General Perry.
Rep. Perry (01:31:30):
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you ladies and gentlemen, for your attendance and your service to national security for our country. I'm going to start with Director Patel and then go to Director Gabbard. I'm concerned, like many Americans, about the wide-scale purchase of land real estate, etc. by the Chinese Communist Party or those sanctioned by the party in America, especially those lands proximate to sensitive military sites or sensitive national security sites. Director Patel, I think we can all understand that that could lead to the ease of nefarious activities of numerous sorts. What do you think should be our posture or our policy from a national security standpoint regarding the purchases of these land and the ownership, occupation, utilization, etc. by the Communist party sanctioned use?
Kash Patel (01:32:23):
Well, Congressman, I appreciate the question, and I'm not going to shape foreign or national policy, but from the FBI perspective, if we had federal statutes to enact criminal allegations and pursue those relating to these matters, we would do so. I agree with you that having CCP actors purchasing large swaths of land next to military installations is a national security issue, a major one. And I would highlight to the American public, we're not allowed to buy farmland in mainland China or in Russia. So I don't know why we let that happen here, but that's a personal matter for me. If I were given more legislation
Kash Patel (01:33:00):
… on it. I would love to act on it.
Rep. Perry (01:33:02):
Thank you. Director Gabbard, I'm going to look at, keeping with the same theme, crypto mining by the sanction. Well, you can't crypto-mine in China, right? It's outlawed in China. However, of course, we're supportive of crypto. I am in the United States of America, but China's mining in America where they can't mine in China.
(01:33:26)
And in particular, I'm thinking about one site where the mining was occurring close to intercontinental ballistic missiles and CFIUS was tipped off by Microsoft. And of course there are actions ongoing.
(01:33:44)
Should the Chinese Communist Party sanctioned individuals or interests be allowed to crypto-mine near sensitive military or national security sites in the United States of America? And if not, what should we be doing about it?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:34:01):
Thank you for your question, Congressman. I'm not fully aware and up to date on the specific example that you've mentioned and I'll go and look into that and-
Rep. Perry (01:34:12):
Happy to provide-
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:34:12):
… get back to you further. Absolutely. Look forward to having the conversation with you. Broadly, this is obviously a concern that any of these activities occurring near or around any of our military sites creates that potential national security risk and the potential for foreign intelligence collection.
Rep. Perry (01:34:35):
I'm hoping it's a priority for everybody on the dais there. It is a priority I think for the American people, certainly for me. I want to move on in the time remaining with a related topic, which is the hundreds of incidents by predominantly Chinese students, oftentimes called Gate-Crashers. So this includes the two gentlemen in uniform on the dais.
(01:34:57)
I'm going to kind of point to three events that happened just last year. One in Grayling, Michigan. Five Chinese students are charged for lying and concealing evidence. One in the University of Minnesota where a drone flew over Newport News and took pictures of classified information regarding ships and classified systems. And then one at the University of Florida regarding the illicit acquisition and shipment of toxins, biomedical drugs, and research supplies to China.
(01:35:28)
In these cases or most of these cases, we encounter these people and then we release these people. As a matter of fact, in the case of Florida, apparently she found out that criminal charges were being prepared and she dropped out of school and her whereabouts remain unknown at this point.
(01:35:47)
What should be our posture? Because we're trying to follow up after the fact. We're encountering these people, whether they're Gate-Crashers or whether we catch them conducting this illicit activity. We try and prosecute, that takes a lot of man-hours as you know Director Patel. Is this the best policy or is there something better that we can do?
(01:36:07)
I mean, the Immigration Nationality Act of 1952 gives the Secretary of State the authority to revoke visas, but should these people be allowed to come to this country in the first place? Is the question. And what should our posture be? Anybody?
Kash Patel (01:36:26):
In terms of the visa issue, I know that the administration is working on a policy, but to directly answer your question, anybody who utilizes the student visa program to come to this country to conduct criminal activity should never be allowed in this country. And anyone that's doing it here in the United States of America from an FBI standpoint will be vigorously investigated and we'll use the expulsion or criminal process on them.
Rep. Perry (01:36:49):
I yield Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Crawford (01:36:50):
Gentleman yields. Ms. Plaskett.
Ms. Plaskett (01:36:53):
Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, and good morning to the witnesses. First, let me say that we do have to, in this committee, try as much as possible to remain nonpartisan as opposed to bipartisan.
(01:37:09)
I can recall being that way when I was counsel on the House Ethics Committee and it's a really hard position to take. But I'm really struck by the fact that in December of 2023, many people made Secretary Lloyd Austin go through the stages of the cross in self-flagellation and mea culpas for not informing the president that he was having a surgery and now how we're treating Secretary Hegseth as if he is untouchable.
(01:37:41)
Mike Waltz, when he was a member of Congress, went in the committee on Armed Services to talk of and slammed Austin for holding himself to a different standard than the American people. And yet we are not doing this across the board and that's disappointing at the very least. Very disappointing.
(01:38:04)
Director Gabbard, thank you for your testimony. And one of the things that I believe I heard you say was that when there was a discussion by DOGE as to the cuts to foreign aid, that there had not been a request for an intelligence and national security or an intelligence assessment of the impact of those cuts. Was that your testimony a little earlier?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:38:30):
Congresswoman I have not seen any kind of actual official assessment either within the intelligence community or outside of it on what the effects of those cuts to USAID programs has been.
Ms. Plaskett (01:38:44):
But it was not requested by DOGE of you or of any of the areas in which you have oversight over?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:38:50):
I'm not aware of any requests.
Ms. Plaskett (01:38:52):
Okay, great. Thank you. I know that there has been some open source reporting on what the effect of those cuts are. I mean, when we think about several examples, Kenya, our strongest regional ally in the Horn of Africa and a key partner with us in the fight against terrorist group Al-Shabaab.
(01:39:09)
And according to the Washington Post, that's not definitive and we can talk about this in closed session. Some Kenyan journalists are now being trained by Beijing, mirroring the US programs that have been cut by the administration. Director Gabbard, is letting China train Kenyan journalists going to make Kenya more or less receptive to American requests of the Kenyan government, do you believe?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:39:37):
As you said Congresswoman, our relationship with Kenya has been very longstanding in-
Ms. Plaskett (01:39:43):
So do cuts of ours to train journalists in Kenya make them more or less… and Beijing having that make them more or less receptive?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:39:51):
Clearly there is strategic competition taking place. I'll withhold my personal view to look at an official assessment.
Ms. Plaskett (01:39:57):
Well, I was asking for your director view, not your personal view. And then additionally we have ended Voice of America, which provided accurate, unbiased news in our opinion. Meanwhile, as St. Petersburg University has announced that it's open 11 Russian language centers across Africa that pay special attention to the promotion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values. Director Gabbard, is Russia a friend or a foe? Are they our friend or our adversary?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:40:30):
They are an adversary.
Ms. Plaskett (01:40:31):
Thank you. I believe that this reckless cuts make terrorism and our influence in Africa, which is on the front lines of terrorism, a real threat to us and we need to be careful of it.
(01:40:46)
Director Patel, one of the benefits of being here kind of in the middle is I get to hear other people's testimony and the questions that are asked. I know that Mr. Carson asked you questions specifically about the counterterrorism division. And we know that there has been some open source reporting that says that individuals within that division have been removed or been moved, not necessarily fired but moved. Do you know if that is correct?
Kash Patel (01:41:14):
I don't have any personal information on that, but people within the CTD component, which is a large component of the FBI move all the time.
Ms. Plaskett (01:41:22):
And have they been moved? Are you able to get that information to us whether they have or have not been moved?
Kash Patel (01:41:28):
I'll go back to my team and see who has been moved. If you have a particular interest, we'll share it with you.
Ms. Plaskett (01:41:33):
Of course, we have an interest in counterterrorism division and movement of individuals within that because one of the other things I'm concerned about is you have stated, I believe in other areas that the disbandment of certain sections of the FBI related to Intel and breaking up components. Can you explain to us how you intend to do that or what you would like to do and why?
Kash Patel (01:41:59):
My intention is to reprioritize counterintelligence authorities and cyber capabilities to focus on violent crime and national security. And that's what I'm doing.
Mr. Crawford (01:42:10):
The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Ms. Plaskett (01:42:11):
Thank you.
Mr. Crawford (01:42:12):
The gentlewoman from Missouri. Madam Ambassador, Ms. Wagner.
Ms. Wagner (01:42:16):
I thank you Mr. Chairman, and I thank all of you for being here and for your continued service to our country. Director Ratcliffe, you have repeatedly stated that China is our top national security threat and I agree. What was the biggest gap in intelligence collection toward China during the previous administration?
John Ratcliffe (01:42:47):
Good to see you, Congresswoman. I think our collection against China is a hard target and the prior administration was lacking in several areas. I would say primarily in human collection and also with regard to the processing of open source information relating to China.
(01:43:09)
I think part of that relates Congresswoman to the policies of the prior administration about treating China as a pacing competitor, I think was the word, as opposed to an adversary.
(01:43:26)
So one of the things in my focus as CIA director, which carried over from my time as DNI in seeing all of our intelligence, seeing that China is our greatest geopolitical threat and focusing the CIA specifically more directly in all areas of our collection on China as a hard target.
Ms. Wagner (01:43:45):
Well, and I'm grateful to hear you say the words open source. So as I hope that all of you may be aware, I am honored to be the chair of the new open source intelligence subcommittee for HIPC. It is the first time this committee has focused specifically on an intelligence discipline, I'll say.
(01:44:08)
We established this subcommittee because private companies, researchers, and most importantly foreign adversaries as we speak, are taking full advantage of the explosion of commercially available information.
(01:44:23)
HIPC has taken a stance that OsInt open source intelligence, should mature as a primary discipline on its own accord. Director Ratcliffe, your agency kind of produces the lion's share, I'd say, of OsInt. Do you agree, sir, that open source intelligence should mature to be a primary discipline?
John Ratcliffe (01:44:46):
Absolutely agree. So as you know, well, Congresswoman, the CIA is the functional manager for OsInt just as we are the functional manager for human to across the IC. And OsInt open source intelligence reaches frankly policymakers as the most cited material in the president's daily brief as part of a long list of tailored production-
Ms. Wagner (01:45:12):
By a large percentage.
John Ratcliffe (01:45:12):
… that we do. By a large percentage. But also, as you know and as you've pointed out Congresswoman, until recently, one of the greatest weaknesses with regard to OsInt was that the collection was so large that it was daunting for use by mission partners across the IC.
(01:45:28)
So the CIA's open source enterprise pioneered the use of AI to triage that collection as it comes in. And what that allows us to do is to summarize collection from over 225 languages into English and to put that in the hands of policymakers. Again, showing that the CIA is focused on using technology to tackle some of the challenges to-
Ms. Wagner (01:45:52):
And I thank you.
John Ratcliffe (01:45:53):
… intelligence collection.
Ms. Wagner (01:45:54):
There is so much innovation in technology in this and the investments being made across the IC to purchase data, but it appears to be in silos to be perfectly honest and lacking maybe an integrated approach. I believe that is because there frankly is no clear lead for OsInt in the IC.
(01:46:13)
And as part of my oversight responsibilities, I plan to review the various ways in which the intelligence community buys commercially available information to determine if there is a more efficient, cost-effective approach, especially when it comes to the taxpayer's expense. Director Gabbard and then Director Ratcliffe, can you, and in my brief time, quickly share your thoughts on which agency should be the primary organization to manage OsInt and why?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:46:40):
Thank you Congresswoman, and thank you for your leadership in this area. I look forward to following up with you in detail, but the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is tackling exactly the problem that you've identified.
(01:46:52)
That we have multiple elements across the intelligence community, essentially wasting taxpayer dollars by contracting separately to get after the same collection of OsInt and commercially available intelligence. So this is something we are actively working on and look forward to working with you and-
Ms. Wagner (01:47:10):
And do you agree with Director Ratcliffe that this should be a key discipline?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:47:15):
Yes, I do.
Ms. Wagner (01:47:16):
Thank you. My time's expired. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Crawford (01:47:19):
The gentlewoman yields. Mr. Gomez.
Mr. Gomez (01:47:22):
Thank you Mr. Chairman. So I want to make a few things clear before we move on to other questions regarding the Signal chat. Director Gabbard, yesterday before the CETNI intelligence committee, specifically when answering Senator Kelly, you repeatedly said you did not recall any discussion in the Houthi PC small group discussing operational details, strike targets, the type of vehicles, and military units involved, or the timing and order of strikes. Do you stand by your testimony from yesterday that you do not recall any of the discussions regarding this type of classified information? Yes or no?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:48:01):
My response in the Senate yesterday, yes, I stand by that response. Obviously, the release of the screenshots that came from that chat group today were a refresher on what happened. As I said earlier, I was not involved with that portion of the chat, so it did not come to my recollection yesterday.
Mr. Gomez (01:48:23):
Thank you. So I take that as you stand by your do-not-recall yesterday stance when you were asked those questions. You've been in office 43 days. Director Ratcliffe has been in office 62 days. This was considered the first major military operation using lethal force of the Trump administration. This was probably the first time that you've been involved with a discussion like this on a thread.
(01:48:56)
It was not discussing, you were not on a group chat discussing where we're go for lunch. You were discussing putting men and women of the armed services in harm's way. That's a major decision. And when did that happen? 10 days ago. Okay, I'll answer that. It happened 10 days ago.
(01:49:19)
Here's the point: something of this magnitude, it's something that you would not forget. It's something that most people, if you're taking this job so seriously, that you would not forget.
(01:49:36)
I mean, since I've been on this committee, there's been days that I have woken up in the middle of the night from the things I've learned in the SCIF. So deciding to use military force is something hard to imagine. So the do-not-recall doesn't pass the smell test. It makes it… It's unbelievable that was the case. So that's what the American people don't understand.
(01:50:03)
And I know a lot of folks in this administration were saying that they're going to take on the establishment and drain the swamp, but you have become that swamp in a matter of days, not weeks or months, days.
(01:50:15)
So one of the things we are going to look into is what actually occurred, because the American people deserve a full accounting. Additionally, the main person who was involved in this thread that a lot of people want to talk to is Secretary of Defense Hegseth. And a lot of questions were brought up regarding his drinking habits in his confirmation hearing. To your knowledge, do you know whether Pete Hegseth had been drinking before he leaked classified information?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:50:49):
I don't have any knowledge of Secretary Hegseth's personal habits.
Mr. Gomez (01:50:54):
Director Ratcliffe, same question. Yes or no?
John Ratcliffe (01:51:01):
No, I'm going to answer that. I think that's an offensive line of questioning. The answer is no. I find it interesting that you want to… No-
Mr. Gomez (01:51:08):
I yield back-
John Ratcliffe (01:51:08):
No, I'm going answer-
Mr. Gomez (01:51:09):
This is my time. Director!
John Ratcliffe (01:51:10):
You asked me a question, you want an answer?
Mr. Gomez (01:51:11):
No, listen, it's-
John Ratcliffe (01:51:12):
You don't want to focus on the good work that the CIA is doing, that the-
Mr. Gomez (01:51:15):
No!
John Ratcliffe (01:51:16):
… intelligence community-
Mr. Gomez (01:51:17):
Director-
John Ratcliffe (01:51:18):
You want to talk about-
Mr. Gomez (01:51:18):
… I reclaim my time! Director, I reclaim my time. I have huge respect for the CIA, huge respect for our men and women in uniform. But this was a question that's on the top of minds of every American, right?
(01:51:33)
He stood in front of a podium in Europe holding a drink. So of course we want to know if his performance is compromised. If you or people were asking if the General Austin was compromised because of a heart issue, I think-
John Ratcliffe (01:51:52):
Was his performance compromised because of a successful strike?
Mr. Gomez (01:51:56):
I yield back. Mr… I bring my-
John Ratcliffe (01:51:57):
Do you want to know?
Mr. Gomez (01:51:58):
I reclaim my time.
John Ratcliffe (01:51:58):
Do you want to talk about accepting responsibility?
Mr. Gomez (01:52:00):
I reclaim my time.
John Ratcliffe (01:52:01):
Do you think you should have-
Mr. Gomez (01:52:02):
I claim my time.
John Ratcliffe (01:52:02):
… responsibility for a successful strike to make Americans safer? You want to focus on-
Mr. Gomez (01:52:07):
I reclaim my time. I reclaim my time. So here's the thing, this is serious. As somebody… We've been briefed in this committee about using Signal. One of the things they basically said, the most secure phone call, the least secure text messaging. And we know that your people are Russians, Chinese are on your phone.
Mr. Crawford (01:52:29):
The gentleman's time expired. Gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Klein.
Mr. Klein (01:52:34):
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I'm going to give the director the ability to respond without being interrupted by his questioner.
John Ratcliffe (01:52:40):
I appreciate that, Congressman. I guess, just a general reflection here, again, that for the last two days, members of the intelligence community have been asking questions about a Signal messaging group and not asking questions from Democrats either in the Senate or the House on China, Russia, Iran, and the real threats that are going on to the United States.
(01:53:11)
And you can say that you care about the good work that agencies are doing like the CIA and that you care about 140 stars on the wall. But no one's asked me about my second day on the job here where I lit the fuse that led to a foreign government participating with us to capture one of the senior planners of the Abbey Gate bombing that killed 13 Americans.
(01:53:39)
And in the process we worked with a government that previously hadn't, so it… that hadn't cooperated with us on counterterrorism matters or the fact no one has focused on that within an hour of that taking place, I was on the phone with Director Patel and a few hours later with Attorney General Bondi working together, the IC and the FBI, working together to bring this person home in less than a week. An unprecedented success for the intelligence community and the law enforcement community.
(01:54:12)
Exactly representative of the kind of work that we should be doing and the kind of work that an oversight committee should be asking about. But instead, we're getting questions about whether or not someone has drinking habits. And I just wish in an annual threats hearing where the American people want to hear about threats, that that's what we would be talking about. Thanks for the opportunity to clarify.
Mr. Klein (01:54:35):
Absolutely. Director, I want to thank you and all the people who work with you and all the witnesses and the brave men and women who are putting their lives on the line each and every day for this country and to the military as well. We are grateful and we recognize the sacrifice and dedication.
(01:54:56)
Director Ratcliffe, you talked about China being our top national security threat, and I want to go to what really is the most active and persistent threat. It's related to cyber; it's related to the People's Republic of China cyber activities, Volt Typhoon, Flax Typhoon, Salt Typhoon targeting US critical infrastructure, targeting critical infrastructure overseas, compromising US telecommunication companies.
(01:55:28)
And I want to ask Director Gabbard… There are also regular compromises of government networks in the defense intelligence base. The Chinese are acting with impunity in targeting the United States. Clearly the last administration had no effective deterrent strategy. Considering a whole of government approach to leverage legal export control, trade, and other levers, is there more that the US can be doing to deter China's cyber aggression?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (01:55:58):
Thank you, Congressman, for your question. In short, the answer is yes. Much of that relies on our intergovernmental planning and operations, but also very closely integrating with our private sector partners.
(01:56:13)
This is essential for us to be able to harden our own cyber infrastructure, our own critical infrastructure, and to look at what our capabilities both defensive and offensive are and how those should be used.
(01:56:26)
If I may, Congressman, I'd just like to address Congressman Gomez's maligning of my reputation and not giving me the opportunity even to respond to his accusations. What occurred in that Signal chat was an update to national security cabinet members that was also issued around the same time as updates to our foreign partners and allies in the region.
(01:56:52)
There were no sources, methods, locations, or names of targets that were included in that chat. The decision to conduct this operation had been made long before that conversation took place.
(01:57:04)
I do take my responsibility very seriously and played an integral role in providing the intelligence community's assessments that led to the ultimate decision by the president to conduct an operation, which by the way was very successful and continues to be very successful. I was traveling at the time and I was not playing a very specific role as these chats reflect in much of the conversation that took place there.
(01:57:35)
Secretary Hegseth and my experience has continued to operate in the way that President Trump's confidence in him inspires, which is in the best interests of the American people and our warfighters and ensuring our national security. I think it's wrong to impugn him, especially at a point where he is not here to defend his own honor. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Klein (01:57:58):
I agree with your assessment and support for the secretary, and I yield back.
Mr. Crawford (01:58:01):
The gentleman yields. Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan (01:58:03):
Thank you for the time and I struggle… And if you look at my notes, I've changed my mind about a million times what I'd like to talk about. I'd like to first start with Director Ratcliffe.
(01:58:13)
I find it offensive for you to accuse me as a Democrat of not caring about national threats. I very much wanted to talk about those. In fact, had prepared questions in advance of this hearing about those threats, specifically about biosecurity and bioterrorism. But I don't have time to ask those questions because the threat is in the house. The threat is across the dais and I need to ask these questions. It's my job to ask these questions of you.
(01:58:43)
Because when I served in the military and I served in classified environments, had this happened to me, I would have walked my resignation in immediately. This is not okay. Communicating these sorts of things in Signal is not okay. Targets, times, those kinds of things are absolutely classified. And we all know it. I know it. These people know it. You all know it.
(01:59:08)
And the fact that we're having to have these conversations now means that I can't ask the questions that I need to ask about things like bioterrorism and biosecurity. And so I'd like to put you in check as well, sir, because you cannot assume who I am any more than I can assume who you are, sir.
(01:59:25)
I would like to move my questions; however, over to Director Gabbard, because you are the DNI. You do have an obligation and a responsibility. I'm going to speak to you specifically about the fact that you have spent much of your 40 days talking about the importance of making sure that we don't reveal classified information, making sure that we don't leak information.
(01:59:50)
You're a former battalion commander in the Army. I don't think that you would have necessarily appreciated the kind of leaking of information that I believe absolutely did happen in this Signal channel and is worthy of a further investigation.
(02:00:02)
In fact, this committee established something called 50 USC §3235a. And this committee on a bipartisan, a partisan basis, requires you, the DNI, to swiftly notify Congress and the Intelligence Committee if you're aware of any sort of significant unauthorized disclosure or compromise of classified information, which I would argue this has all of the markings of being that.
(02:00:26)
And so if you as the DNI see such a thing anywhere within your organization's purview, you have the obligation to begin an investigation to report back to us on that. Would this seem to qualify to you as something worthy of that investigation?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:00:43):
Thank you for your question, Congresswoman. In this situation, Secretary Hegseth has the classification-
Ms. Houlahan (02:00:49):
Yes or no?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:00:49):
… and declassification-
Ms. Houlahan (02:00:50):
You are the DNI.
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:00:52):
… authority over-
Ms. Houlahan (02:00:53):
You-
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:00:54):
… DOD information.
Ms. Houlahan (02:00:55):
This chat did not have the auspice of being a DOD chat. There's no such thing as labeling it as DOD. This was a chat amongst a great variety of people and you, according to our law that we passed here bipartisanly, have an obligation. When you think there has been a tangible, significant leak of information to instigate an investigation, do you not think it's important to do such a thing?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:01:18):
Well, the National Security Council is investigating-
Ms. Houlahan (02:01:20):
Yes or no?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:01:21):
… this inadvertent leak. And again, I point to Secretary Hegseth as having the classification that you ask-
Ms. Houlahan (02:01:26):
I would argue that Secretary Hegseth-
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:01:27):
… [inaudible 02:01:28] authority.
Ms. Houlahan (02:01:28):
… if he had the dignity that he needs to have, should be walking his resignation in because I believe that he's probably is heading toward being relieved of his duty based on what I think are significant and illegal leaks, most likely.
(02:01:41)
I would like it if you would please commit to this organization that you will follow the law. And I would like it if you would also investigate what is likely to be more than just this chat. Because if there's one, there's more than one. If there's smoke, there's fire. Would you please obligate yourself and your organization to that investigation?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:01:58):
Yeah. Congresswoman, yes, I will follow the law.
Ms. Houlahan (02:02:00):
Thank you. I appreciate that. And Director Patel, I learned just recently that you only heard about this yesterday, which blows my mind since I heard about it two days ago. And I'm just a low on the dais, junior chipmunk here. Did you really only hear about this yesterday?
Kash Patel (02:02:14):
The exact timeline I'm not aware of, but yeah, I think it was yesterday or the night before.
Ms. Houlahan (02:02:19):
And now that another day has passed, do you believe-
Kash Patel (02:02:21):
Well, actually it was the night before the hearing.
Ms. Houlahan (02:02:22):
Now that another day has passed, do you believe that it's now time, potentially, for the FBI to open an investigation into this?
Kash Patel (02:02:28):
I'm not going to comment on that.
Ms. Houlahan (02:02:29):
Because you're the director of the FBI, you don't believe it's appropriate to comment on that?
Kash Patel (02:02:33):
Because there's a process in place, there's an ongoing litigation, and the National Security Council is reviewing this matter, and I'm not going to discuss any open or closed investigation.
Ms. Houlahan (02:02:42):
That ongoing investigation, literally the lawsuit happened today or yesterday afternoon. And the idea that you don't have an opinion on this at this point is frustrating to me.
Kash Patel (02:02:52):
No, it's not.
Ms. Houlahan (02:02:52):
If I don't question-
Kash Patel (02:02:52):
I'm not going to prejudge any matters-
Ms. Houlahan (02:02:52):
… I'm reclaiming my time. My final question-
Kash Patel (02:02:52):
… and the men and women of the FBI-
Ms. Houlahan (02:02:54):
I'm reclaiming my time. Reclaiming my time.
Kash Patel (02:02:56):
… I will call the balls and strikes.
Ms. Houlahan (02:02:57):
Reclaiming my time, sir.
Kash Patel (02:02:57):
Not you.
Ms. Houlahan (02:02:58):
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to have-
Kash Patel (02:02:59):
Gentleman's recognized. You have four seconds-
Ms. Houlahan (02:03:01):
Remaining.
Kash Patel (02:03:01):
… remaining.
Ms. Houlahan (02:03:02):
No, I have more than because-
Mr. Crawford (02:03:03):
You two seconds remaining
Ms. Houlahan (02:03:04):
… Mr. Patel would not acknowledge-
Mr. Crawford (02:03:05):
Gentlewoman's time is expired. Mr. Stubby.
Mr. Stubby (02:03:08):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Gabbard, were there any sources described in the Signal chat?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:03:14):
No, Congressman.
Mr. Stubby (02:03:15):
Were there any methods described in the Signal chat?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:03:18):
No.
Mr. Stubby (02:03:18):
Were there any locations?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:03:20):
No.
Mr. Stubby (02:03:20):
Therefore, due to the fact that there were no sources, no methods nor locations described in the Signal chat, it does not make the discussion classified. Is that correct?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:03:29):
That is up to the Secretary of Defense determination.
Mr. Stubby (02:03:31):
The Democrats are obviously making the assertions that what was in the Signal chat was classified and claiming that Secretary Hegseth put this war plan out to the world, which he clearly did not. Were there any names in the Signal chat?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:03:43):
No.
Mr. Stubby (02:03:44):
Any targets?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:03:45):
No.
Mr. Stubby (02:03:46):
Any locations?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:03:47):
No.
Mr. Stubby (02:03:47):
Was there a unit name or a location of that unit?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:03:51):
There was not.
Mr. Stubby (02:03:51):
Were there any routes described in the Signal chat?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:03:53):
No.
Mr. Stubby (02:03:54):
Wouldn't an operational plan contain that type of information?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:03:58):
Every operational plan I've ever seen has
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:04:00):
… contain that information.
Mr. Stubby (02:04:01):
Thank you. Shifting to the real threats to America, the southern border, due to the previous administration's open border policies, they allowed over 10 million illegals into our country. And during that time, there was 1,511 terrorist-related encounters at land border ports of entry according to CBP. As someone who fought in the war on terror, I find this deeply offensive that the previous administration would sacrifice the security and safety of the American people in the manner in which they allowed terrorists, criminals, and rapists into our country. In your testimony, you state, and I quote, "Based on the latest reporting available for year-long period ending October 2024, cartels were largely responsible for the deaths of more than 54,000 US citizens from synthetic opioids. A lot of those citizens are from my home state of Florida. Cartels, narco-terrorists, and other violent transnational criminal organizations have violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the United States and have also fueled human trafficking and the opioid epidemic that many of my fellow Floridians have witnessed for far too long.
(02:05:01)
I applaud President Trump and his swift decision to designate the narco-terrorists and Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations and I want to thank each of you for making this a priority to fight against Mexican cartels, traffickers, narco-terrorists that have been responsible for killing hundreds of thousands of Americans. For every narco-terrorist and cartel member violating our sovereignty poisoning the American people with fentanyl and other illicit opioids, know this, your days are numbered and know that the full force of the US government will soon address your atrocities once and for all." Director Patel, it's no secret that there is a growing presence of Mexican cartels operating fentanyl synthesis labs just over our border. Just last year, the CBP estimates that more than 21,000 pounds of fentanyl was seized at our borders. That is enough to kill more than twice the population of our country. What actions are you taking to strengthen the FBI's fight against illicit fentanyl within our borders?
Kash Patel (02:05:57):
Thank you, Congressman. It's good to see you. We have made it a priority at the FBI because fentanyl and illegal narcotics killing American citizen every seven minutes, that is a national security crisis, not just at the southern border, but at the northern border. And the Mexican cartels, along with their illicit partners in the CCP and other adversarial countries that are doing harm are not just taking the fight down south, but they're bringing it up north. So we need to be more vigilant as to what's coming in through our northern border as well. Known and suspected terrorists are flowing in through our northern border more there are our southern border, I would say, because of the successes we've had in closing the southern border. But when it comes specifically, excuse me, to fentanyl, we are making, to date, since January 20th, 383 kilograms of seizures of illegal fentanyl, which is enough to kill 29 million Americans.
Mr. Stubby (02:06:42):
And other than enhancing border security measures, what would be the most worthwhile action the United States could take to eliminate the cartels and stop the flow of illicit fentanyl?
Kash Patel (02:06:51):
I got one answer for you. They're making the precursors in mainland China and we don't have the authorities to go after that fight there and we need to take it head-on. Because without the chemicals and precursors, there is no fentanyl, and they're moving that material around the world and into the United States too freely.
Mr. Stubby (02:07:08):
Director Gabbard, I'd like to re-emphasize the threat that our adversaries are exploiting via fentanyl and other illicit drugs that are entering our country through the border in poisoning millions of Americans nationwide. It's essential that all components of our national security apparatus are united in their efforts to protect the American people and our communities from such harm. Is there any reason to believe that the Mexican government isn't doing enough to finally eradicate the cartels and other transnational criminal organizations operating just over the border?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:07:36):
Congressman, I can only speak from my vantage point. As was stated previously by Director Ratcliffe, we have already been introduced to and begun collaborating with our counterparts in the Mexican government. Could there be more done? I would say absolutely yes. I know that the Trump administration, across his cabinet, are looking at opportunities to be able to do that.
Mr. Stubby (02:07:58):
And Director Patel just hit on this with CCP and precursors, but to what extent have we seen other malicious actors worldwide partner with the cartels to infiltrate and target the United States?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:08:10):
Related to the production of fentanyl-
Mr. Stubby (02:08:12):
Yes, ma'am.
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:08:13):
… India is one of those countries that is providing some of those precursor materials as well as equipment.
Mr. Stubby (02:08:21):
Thank you for being here today. My time's expired.
Mr. Crawford (02:08:23):
Gentleman yields. Mr. Quigley.
Rep. Mike Quigley (02:08:25):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I know it's all us who are worried about this only, but apparently, the Senate Armed Services Committee chair and ranking member requested [inaudible 02:08:35] on this chat. So I'll tell you why more people are worried about this than you might think and that's… Director Gabbard, your position was created post-9/11 because of the horrible intel failure that took place, that we weren't sharing information. It wasn't adequately shared within the community and between our allies. We have to believe that our allies look at this as a colossal mistake and at least hesitate to a certain extent wanting to share sensitive information with us that keeps us safe because they're worried about their sources and methods as well. Wouldn't you be at least somewhat concerned that our allies would look at this and say, "That wasn't the perfect way to communicate"?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:09:28):
Congressman, thank you for the question. If that information that was put out in the chat by the secretary of defense had included specific sources, and methods, and targets, and names, then the answer would be yes, but that was not the case.
Rep. Mike Quigley (02:09:42):
Let me stop you there, because I have such a limited time. Generals, look, you're here because you got tough spots, so I have to put you on the spots. You're passing information like this just within your agency and you know that it's going to include, "We are go for mission launch Houthi's sea lanes… The information about the weapon systems. That gets to the Houthi military commanders. Doesn't it make you think they're at least going to say, "Duck"?
Jeffrey Kruse (02:10:18):
Thank you for the opportunity to weigh in on the issue. Yes, if we were collecting this on our adversaries and we're able to get this information as was asked of General Haugh earlier, we would consider that classified, but it's classified under the collection piece. The data that we're talking about here is the operational data, not the intelligence data that's classified-
Rep. Mike Quigley (02:10:42):
Respectfully, sir, just because we have limited time, the Houthi's military leader's going to duck when he hears this or he is going to take some action or he's going to try to shoot our planes down, right?
Jeffrey Kruse (02:10:53):
If he has actionable intelligence, he will certainly use-
Rep. Mike Quigley (02:10:55):
I'm talking about this intelligence. You don't think he can figure out? Houthi's, as mentioned a couple times, sea lanes, they show the weapon system, at least it's a credible warning to him?
Jeffrey Kruse (02:11:08):
I would offer that Houthi's defensive position has been constant since the 15th of March.
Rep. Mike Quigley (02:11:13):
All right. General, I'll just take a whack at it. You're the Houthi's military leader, you get this information passed on to you, it doesn't make you at least take warning?
General Timothy D. Haugh (02:11:27):
I would, Congressman. I think from the Houthi's perspective, they do have air defense equipment and they would be able to detect aircraft when they're entered into the Red Sea and certainly when we have our intelligence aircraft operating over top of their country. They'd be able to detect that activity.
Rep. Mike Quigley (02:11:47):
But being forewarned is extraordinarily important. I'll take another stab at it. Just language like this in a different context. Okay? But just within your department, sir, your people are passing this information, do you advise that maybe they don't use signal on this? Are there other forms obviously they're going to be more secure?
Jeffrey Kruse (02:12:14):
What I would offer is the data that we would be passing would be the full target packages and the full set of operational information and that would-
Rep. Mike Quigley (02:12:22):
Okay, but even it was just this, do you really want to give possibilities that they could be breached, hacked, and they would get this information? Even with just this or, respectfully, wouldn't you want to use a more secure means of communicating?
Jeffrey Kruse (02:12:38):
I think what I would offer, two things, and hopefully they're helpful to you. One of them would be in addition to that full package that we would talk about, when the secretary extracted individual details from that and provided those on signal, whether individually or an aggregate, that his decision of what is classified and what is not from an operational aspect. And that's probably the most important relevant piece to there. And I would echo what we've said before, it's the secretary's authority for the-
Rep. Mike Quigley (02:13:08):
Just give me… There's more secure ways of communicating any of this. Right?
Jeffrey Kruse (02:13:12):
There are, and our adversaries have-
Rep. Mike Quigley (02:13:15):
All right. General, there are. Right?
Jeffrey Kruse (02:13:15):
… to intercept.
Rep. Mike Quigley (02:13:16):
There's much more secure means that you use, even if you don't think that this is or you don't want to stick your head out on it.
General Timothy D. Haugh (02:13:26):
I would say is the full packages were transmitted within traditional classified-
Rep. Mike Quigley (02:13:32):
But this could have been transmitted in a classified way as well. Thank you.
Mr. Crawford (02:13:36):
Gentleman's time has expired. A gentleman from Arkansas, the distinguished chair of the financial services committee, Mr. Hill's recognized.
Rep. French Hill (02:13:42):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me say, Director Gabbard and Director Ratcliffe, it's so great to have you back in the Longworth House Office Building. The food's the same, but you're welcome anytime. Director Ratcliffe, we've served for 10 years together. I'm certainly aware of your extraordinary service at the DNI and here in Congress, and I just have a couple of follow-up questions on this topic of the signal chat. Were there any war plans distributed in that signal chat?
Director John Ratcliffe (02:14:11):
No, Congressman.
Rep. French Hill (02:14:12):
And were sources and methods that would compromise our intelligence system or your agents in the field around the world, were they discussed on the signal chat?
Director John Ratcliffe (02:14:20):
No.
Rep. French Hill (02:14:22):
I appreciate that. I just think that's an important thing to have on the record. Director Patel, I co-chair the Americans wrongfully detained, American hostage task force here in the house and I just, in fact, left Tigran Gambaryan, a former FBI official who I helped get out of prison in Nigeria last year, I just left him a few minutes ago. You know this issue very, very well and President Trump's made such a commitment to bring Americans home. There's some 30 Americans still wrongfully detained or held hostage abroad. Is the FBI committing to work through its officials in our embassies around the world to bring those Americans home?
Kash Patel (02:15:02):
Thank you, Congressman. As you know from my prior service in the prior administration, President Trump brought home over 50 hostages and detainees worldwide. And that effort is being redoubled now until every single American is home. And the FBI, from my perspective, has been given a directive that any wrongfully detained or captured person overseas is a priority to bring back.
Rep. French Hill (02:15:22):
We're so grateful to the president for making this a priority. We don't want our citizens that hold a blue passport to suddenly be a target in all their interactions around the world. That's wrong. And I'm glad President Trump's made it priority. I look forward to working with you on that. Since November of 2023, I've been pursuing aggressively in this committee the US government's policies and procedures for handling border encounters, specifically known or suspected terrorists.
(02:15:48)
To quote former FBI director's testimony before the Senate, "There are blinking lights everywhere of concern. But despite my numerous attempts including multiple briefing requests, letters, legislative provisions, a GAO report requested, the prior administration refused to provide requested information and data on what the public now knows was a very dangerous situation along the US borders that President Trump now has as a priority of fixing. In January 2024, there were 176,000 encounters along the southern border with 51,000 occurring at ports of entry and 124,000 between ports of entry. Comparing that to the work just in the first few weeks of the Trump administration, total encounters are down to 61,000 along the border with 32 at ports of entry and 29,000 between ports of entry." For the record, that's a 60% reduction. Director Patel, since President Trump took office in January, as we've seen these plummeting border encounter numbers, has the country seen a drop in known or suspected terrorist encounters at the border?
Kash Patel (02:16:58):
Thank you, Congressman. It's one of the issues I really wanted to address today. And I think the country deserves to know that known or suspected terrorists, KSTs, are coming in with much less frequency at the southern border. In fact, if my information's correct, two since January 20th and they're coming in with much greater frequency in the northern border. And since January 20th, that number is 34. And those metrics carry out over the last year in terms of ratio. So what it tells me is that known or suspected terrorists, the individuals that want to do the most harm to this country are utilizing the northern border and we got to refocus assets up there.
Rep. French Hill (02:17:34):
Yeah, which I think is good. And I'm glad the prior administration did declassify the ISIS arrests in Philadelphia and did declassify the citizen that was coming across the northern border to do harm on election day. That's good. But we have much more to do. And, Director Gabbard, I need your help working with your colleagues here. It's this idea of requesting coordination between Director Patel, Secretary Noem, and the committee with fused data on known or suspected terrorists, whether it's TSA data, BPP data, FBI internal data, we want to have that coming to us, where are these people, what's been done with them, what is the government's position on… Will you commit to work with us as ODNI to get this information from across the government IC?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:18:20):
Absolutely, Congressman. And as you know, our National Counterterrorism Center was really created to fulfill exactly that task so that we're not dealing with multiple vetting systems that are coming up with different results, that we have this central vetting database to be able to identify those known or suspected terrorists who may be trying to come into our country or who may be one of the tens of millions who illegally cross into our border, may have come into our country during last four years.
Rep. French Hill (02:18:51):
We look forward to working with you. Thank you for your answers. And I yield back.
Mr. Crawford (02:18:54):
Gentleman yields. Miss Tenney.
Rep. Claudia Tenney (02:18:57):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you so much to all of you. There's so many great questions that I have to ask. But I want to start with Director Patel and I just want to first, before I get into a couple issues, thank you so much for your outstanding service, and your recognition, and focus on the northern border. My entire district is the northern border of New York with Canada. I just want to first jump into this issue for… Hamas attacked October 7th, the world watched in horror, designated a foreign terrorist organization, 1997, killed over 1,200 civilians including American citizens and many remain hostages. Only slightly less disturbing, we had a myriad of seemingly coordinated pro-Hamas demonstrations that have taken place all over the United States, in my state of New York, on college campuses, in Washington, DC universities. Director Patel, does the FBI have any open investigations into the organization, the leadership, and the funding of these pro-Hamas demonstrations with students and groups such as Students for Justice in Palestine?
Kash Patel (02:20:00):
Thank you, ma'am. And I'm limited by what the attorney general has already publicized, but as you know, there are open investigations based on what's been made public.
Rep. Claudia Tenney (02:20:07):
Okay. Has the FBI uncovered any evidence of foreign support for these Hamas demonstrations, including, other than Iran, any of these groups I might mention like Students for Justice in Palestine, anything that's open source that we can talk about?
Kash Patel (02:20:18):
That's still ongoing.
Rep. Claudia Tenney (02:20:20):
Thank you. Director Gabbard, thank you so much for your service. It was great to serve with you in Congress as well [inaudible 02:20:25] so much on wonderful veterans issues. My son's also a Marine major, and so we appreciate the service of everybody here. Let's keep in mind, obviously, we're an open session, do you have anything or ongoing intelligence to suggest there's foreign support from governments, non-government groups and individuals that have helped these pro-Hamas demonstrations all across America, including on university campuses?
Director Tulsi Gabbard (02:20:50):
Congresswoman, there are some assessments that reflect that and we can talk about that in the closed session.
Rep. Claudia Tenney (02:20:55):
Great, thank you so much. And now I want to get back to Kash. Director, great work on the northern border. I'm one of the co-founders of Northern Border Security Caucus, and your information has been tremendous. Once I got the district that I represent now, this sprawling long district, entire northern border is Canada, and as you say, 358 suspects on the terror watch list, almost 90% of the suspects on the terror watch list are coming across our northern border. I'd love to talk to you, what is the FBI doing specifically dealing with this northern border and what access point, who are you working with? Is there a way that we have got a way to handle this with the foreign terror threats?
(02:21:40)
And I say this in light of my district specifically, or New York state, led by Democrats, by the way, is notorious for their unwillingness to work with law enforcement under Governor Cuomo. We caught off the ability, I know Congressman Quigley talked about working together after 9/11. The state hit hardest by 9/11, and Governor Cuomo put in a law that prohibited law enforcement from working together in 2019. What are we doing so we can work with the government and others to make sure that this doesn't happen across our New York northern border?
Kash Patel (02:22:13):
Well, one, and this is out of my lane, but what we need to be doing is working with the Canadian government because they sit on top of our northern border. We do have the problem of tyranny of distance and sheer geography as compared to the southern border, but when we were told that the Mexican government would not work with us, we overcame that hurdle and we've seen the immediate results as I highlighted to your colleague about northern border contacts with KSTs versus the southern border. The other thing we can be doing is working across every northern border state who has a geographic border with Canada and their local and state [inaudible 02:22:49] which we are doing at the FBI, but it is such a vast enterprise that we would need a huge increase in resources to cover down on that the way we do in Mexico.
Rep. Claudia Tenney (02:23:00):
Thank you for that. In addition, with working with the Canadians, are you also working with the New York state government because we do have a number of interesting assets, a sprawling Akwesasne Mohawk Reservation that goes across the northern border with New York and Canada or those types of things, ways that you can work with the New York government and also in coordination with the Canadian Royal Police?
Kash Patel (02:23:19):
Absolutely, ma'am. And you highlight a great point. A lot of the northern border touches upon tribal lands, and we need to work with tribal leaders throughout the country as effectively as we do with state and local governments. And at the FBI, we're doing just that.
Rep. Claudia Tenney (02:23:34):
Thank you so much and I really appreciate all of your service, and I yield my time back.
Mr. Crawford (02:23:38):
Gentlewoman yields. Gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon is recognized.
Rep. Pat Fallon (02:23:52):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. Director Patel, many of us had grown increasingly alarmed at the sheer number of foreign nationals we're seeing caught spying on our critical infrastructure or near sensitive sites in the country. One example is a Chinese national who's allegedly flying a drone over Vandenberg and taking pictures of the base. He was arrested in the San Francisco airport not that long after. Director Patel, would you agree that the two most dangerous nation states to our homeland and our interests are China and Russia?
Kash Patel (02:24:26):
Yes, Congressman.
Rep. Pat Fallon (02:24:28):
So it would stand a reason that we should pay particular attention when four nationals from these two countries, who we've already established are the greatest threats to our country now and in the future, when they try to sneak into our country illegally.
Kash Patel (02:24:41):
Absolutely, sir.
Rep. Pat Fallon (02:24:43):
Can you speak on the illegal migration we see from Russia and China and the differences that we saw from the first Trump administration to the Biden administration?
Kash Patel (02:24:52):
Well, one, the problem you have when you have an effective resolution to that set of issues is that the enemy adapts. And what they've done is utilize, as we were just discussing with your colleague, the northern border, to shift their resources and affiliations to pour in known or suspected terrorists through the northern border. They haven't stopped through the southern border. They just know that we are setting up a pretty monumental effort down there to stop any known or suspected terrorists from entering the country. But the thing is, the Chinese, the Russians, Iranians, and other adversaries are utilizing their partners just like they are doing in terms of how they move illicit fentanyl precursors into this country, they're moving humans in the same fashion and we need to treat it as such.
Rep. Pat Fallon (02:25:39):
Did you see an increase from the first Trump administration to the Biden administration on Russian and Chinese nationals crossing the border? Did it increase or decrease?
Kash Patel (02:25:47):
Yes. Actually, so the PRC nationals crossing the southern border from '22 to '25 was 178,000. And I don't have the number for the northern border, sir, but I'll get that to you.
Rep. Pat Fallon (02:25:59):
So, yeah, what we found was there was actually a market increase, alarming, with the Chinese illegal migration increasing 527% all in and Russian, 2400%. And if just one-tenth of 1%… Some tiny fraction, one-tenth of 1% are actually asset sleeper agents loyal to Moscow or Beijing, they could wreak havoc and mayhem in a free and open society. It's very dangerous. And then those are the ones we know about. What about the ones that snuck across and we never found them? The unknown got-aways, if you will. So Director Patel, there's also a great concern about the increasing number of counterintelligence threats that are penetrating all levels and branches of government, both local, state, and federal. The number of elected and appointed officials willing to betray this country is becoming increasingly pervasive.
(02:26:46)
Last year, we saw a former senior aide in the New York Governor's Office, Linda Sun, and her husband, Chris Hu, indicted on charges of money laundering and acting as foreign agents to the People's Republic of China. Ms. Sun used her position to block Taiwanese representatives from access to New York state officials. Instead, [inaudible 02:27:06] rolling out the red carpet for those PRC officials to have those meetings. I mean, that's some scary stuff. So when we have someone like Sue Mi Terry, who also worked covertly spying on Korea while working simultaneously with various think tanks, and she had been a national security official and she'd worked for the CIA and the National Security Council, because of her job, members of Congress and their staffs had access to these Korean intelligence officials and she was paid with… She had thousands of dollars in luxury gifts. But, Director Patel, I get that these investigations are ongoing and sensitive, but to the extent that you can, could you please briefly highlight the security… The severity, rather, of these counterintelligence threats including a rough estimate of the number of open counterintelligence cases that are pending?
Kash Patel (02:27:52):
We have many, and I'll get you the exact number, sir, in closed session. But what it highlights is that the enemy is not relenting. They're actually doubling down and tripling down on their efforts, and there's no sector in government that they won't go to and try to infiltrate and penetrate access and turn people in this country against our own nation. So that is a national security threat of our time, as is the terrorism threat and as is the fentanyl threat, it needs to be treated as such equally. And at the FBI, we're doing that.
Rep. Pat Fallon (02:28:20):
Thank you. And, Director Patel, will you commit to providing this committee with classified briefing on the severity, the FBI processes and procedures, including defensive briefings related to counterintelligence threats involving elected and/or appointed officials?
Kash Patel (02:28:34):
For defensive briefings, Congressman, I commit to you that the FBI will give you everything we have in our holdings. I can't comment on other people's.
Rep. Pat Fallon (02:28:42):
Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank all the witnesses for being here, particularly Mr. John Ratcliffe, Congressional District Four says hello. I yield back.
Mr. Crawford (02:28:49):
Gentleman yields. I just got notice that the baseball shooting report discussed by Vice Chairman Kelly earlier today has been delivered to our SCIF and I appreciate, Director Patel, your responsiveness to that issue. Thank you so much for your commitment and the appropriate transparency demonstrated in that. We appreciate that very much. Since each member has had an opportunity to question our witnesses, I will now close this portion of the hearing and we'll reconvene and close session at 2:00 PM in the [inaudible 02:29:20] spaces. I ask the public and staff to please remain seated until our witnesses depart. Thank you.
